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***Solutions for 'Crisis' in Relations With West Proposed**

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[Article by Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, doctor of historical sciences, professor, deputy director, Historical Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "Russia and the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been over three years since the moment the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Were the promises made so lightly in December 1991 kept? Did the strategy of post-Soviet development produce the anticipated results?

The initial premises of the Russian leadership were rather simple then. Inside the country—transition to a market economy, and creation of a democratic state structure. In foreign policy—in order to ensure favorable conditions for domestic reforms, having rejected the ideological dogmas of Bolshevism, Russia had to not only put an end to the legacy of confrontation from the cold war era, but also quickly join the civilized world—meaning the Western community.

"These relations can now rest upon recognition of shared values and a singular vision of the ways of ensuring international security"[1] was what was said in President Yeltsin's message in Brussels on 20 December 1991. An orientation upon the West was to ensure, on one hand, liberation of internal resources, and on the other, broad support to market reforms in Russia. In this case the former Soviet republics were viewed as a burden to Russia, weighing down and impeding it. It was of course asserted that a fraternity of equal nations with "transparent" borders, in which a common economic and military-political "space" was to be preserved, would be created in place of a superpower held together by force.

There was a certain logic to this. After all, if the transition to an economic and political system of the Western type was proclaimed to be the goal, then ending the cold war was clearly not enough. The West was seen as a "natural ally" of a new, reformed Russia. Everything else appeared to be of secondary importance, a distraction from the main objective.

The Zigzags of Russian Diplomacy

The **first stage** of Russian foreign policy, which lasted until fall 1992, became a period of intensive efforts having the goal of showing the West that Russia was "one of them." While Gromyko earned the nickname "Mr No," Kozyrev became "Mr Yes." It was also asserted that Russia had no interests differing from those of its Western partners. For practical purposes Moscow turned 180 degrees and hurried to assume a pro-Western position on every international issue, be it Yugoslavia or Iraq, China or Afghanistan. We were ready to make every concession, even when we weren't really asked to do so. It would be sufficient to recall the shock to Washington when Moscow suddenly offered its idea of a "global defense system," as if trying to show that since the USSR was against a space-based ABM system, Russia was ready to support its creation.

It was essentially then that the West won its unexpected victory in the cold war which, it seemed just a couple of years before this, should have ended in a draw. Russia hastily departed from Eastern Europe, and from its former "outposts of socialism and progress" in the Third World. Even the CIS found itself somewhere on the far periphery of Moscow's interests, if we disregard the signing of those grandiloquent but totally meaningless declarations.

In the meantime, in no way did Russian diplomacy undergo de-ideologization. On the contrary we went from exporting the ideas of world revolution to exporting "Western values" with the enthusiasm of converts, descending to anticommunist rhetoric in the spirit of Reagan. Moreover none of our concessions carried any kind of conditions. In our haste to satisfy all of the West's wishes, we asked for nothing in return—neither reciprocal concessions, nor guarantees that our actions would not be capitalized upon in order to fill the resulting "vacuum."

But perhaps what is most important is the desire to use foreign policy as a bulldozer for domestic reforms. The most painful economic measures of the times of Gaydar's "shock therapy" were motivated by promises of multibillions in Western aid. But the West never promised us either the 24 or the 42 billion dollars incessantly tossed around in our internal debates. But even if it had made such a promise, it would not have been able to keep it, because the economic depression in the United States, Western Europe and Japan precluded implementation of a "Marshall Plan" for Russia.

The decision to postpone President Yeltsin's visit to Japan in September 1992 became the turning point. Conservative forces won their first victory since the times of the Emergency Committee. This was the first wave of a nationalistic reaction to the excessive expectations (inflated by the reformers themselves). And this was the first sign of transformation of foreign policy into one of the key issues of growing internal political confrontation.

The **second stage** changed the tone of Russian foreign policy somewhat. There appeared the first rather timid

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attempts to show that Russia could take a position differing from the West. The differences concerned, in particular, the issues of arms trading and rocket technology. Russia began straying from its categorical anti-Serbian position in former Yugoslavia. Considerable diversification became discernible in Moscow's diplomacy. But on the whole, the pro-Western orientation persisted. An example of this was the Russian president's consent to the entry of Poland and other Eastern European countries into NATO.

But at the same time, a totally unusual phenomenon became discernible as well: Russian diplomacy became an obvious factor of party politics. It became an instrument for mobilizing foreign political support to one of the forces fighting within the Russian political arena. The Russian minister of foreign affairs perpetually appealed to the West for support to the reformers in the struggle against the "Red-Browns." (It would be sufficient to recall our foreign affairs minister's "joke" in Stockholm, not to mention some things of greater seriousness.)

As a result the "Kuril precedent" became the norm for Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs found itself in a state of perpetual confrontation with the parliament. A situation arose in which any step by the foreign affairs minister was met with bayonets by opposing political forces. In October 1993 the opposition between executive and legislative power mushroomed into open confrontation, ending in the final defeat of the Supreme Soviet, with the sincere blessings of the West.

The **third stage** began after the 12 December 1993 elections. The success of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], which rode in on a nationalistic backlash, had far-reaching consequences. This was to a considerable degree an inevitable reaction to the preceding course. There began rhetorical contests in patriotism, and attempts to "out-slogan" the other side. An urge to "out-Zhirinovskiy Zhirinovskiy" took hold of many recently West-oriented liberals. "Eurasia-ism" became fashionable in its most diverse interpretations.

Of course, the pro-Western inertia still survived. In the first half of 1994 Moscow managed to pronounce "mature strategic partnership" with the United States, to join the NATO program "Partnership for Peace" and to sign a treaty with the European Union. But practical implementation of these measures was immediately placed into question.

The declarative line of Russian diplomacy changed as well. The thesis of defending national interests assumed the forefront. Whereupon the interpretation of these interests became increasingly broader, as seen, first of all, in declaration of the CIS to be a "zone of special Russian interests." At the same time the thesis of divergence and even collision of some interests of Russia and the West enjoyed wide acceptance.

For practical purposes Russia even went as far as mini-confrontation with the United States in a number of important issues because of Bosnia and Iraq. The three years of euphoria were superseded by more-skeptical appraisals of the West. However, what was most striking was the change in attitude toward NATO. Moscow turned 180 degrees, and began speaking out increasingly more forcefully against expansion of the North Atlantic alliance through the inclusion of former Soviet Warsaw Pact allies.

Of course, it is evidently a little too early to say that a fundamental turn has occurred in Russian foreign policy. But the direction of its evolution has changed significantly. A. Kozyrev's open refusal in early December 1994 to sign the agreement on Russia's cooperation with NATO under the "Partnership" program and the West's refusal in Budapest to seriously examine Russia's proposal for building an all-European security system based on the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] rather than NATO demonstrated the fruitlessness of the pro-Western orientation of the foreign policy strategy Moscow had been pursuing since the moment of the USSR's disintegration.

The Crisis

It can be asserted today that Russia's relations with the West are in crisis. The main cause of the crisis can be found in the inability of Russian diplomacy to provide for the country's integration into the Western community as an equal participant of the decision making process. During these years, Moscow was unable to win a place for itself in key economic, political and military bodies created by the West during the cold war.

Russia did of course gain access to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and GATT, but the role it is playing here is one of a suppliant, aid to which is offered for practical purposes under the same harsh terms as to Third World countries. The hopes of a "Marshall Plan" for Russia turned out to be an illusion. Of course, even technical assistance would have been extremely useful to Russia under today's extremely grave conditions, but this support is unable to play the role of a locomotive able to pull the Russian economy out of its crisis. Moreover Western aid is being utilized extremely ineffectively due to various sorts of bureaucratic games.

The process of Russia's de-industrialization that began as a result of disintegration of the military-industrial complex and of light industry led to a sharp imbalance

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in favor of raw material sectors. Russian exports are almost three-fourths petroleum and gas today. And it is into these sectors that Western private investments are primarily being directed. Thus, if anything can be said about Russia's integration into the world economy, then in the best case it is as a colony supplying raw materials.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, it will take Russian machine building 15-20 years to recapture lost ground. In this case the technological gap from the most highly developed countries is continually increasing. And even by absolute indicators, Russia, the GDP of which does not exceed 20 percent of the Soviet figure because of the slump, has already fallen out of the top ten industrially developed countries.

Naturally, from its positions of economic weakness Moscow is not only unable to dictate terms to Western powers, but it cannot even gain recognition as an equal partner. Consequently the hopes of transforming the "Seven" into "Eight" proved empty—Russia falls short of the level at which the members of this select club would be forced to reckon with its interests. Unfortunately the maximum of what we could count on would be "Seven and a Half."

We cannot fail to note that in this time of noticeable chilling of Russia's political relations with the West, our economic dependence continues to grow, approaching the danger mark. The supposedly deficit-free draft budget for 1995 will allow us to make ends meet only if Russia receive a good $12 billion this year, give or take. What is the source of such a firm conviction that the West will finally opt to grant us such a large amount of assistance in a time when political differences between Moscow and the NATO countries are growing sharper? In past years, after all, Western aid to Moscow was more of a symbolic nature.

The total amount of long-term credits granted to Russia by the World Bank since 1992 is only $3 billion, with only three of 10 planned investment projects having gone into effect, and with a total of only $17 million actually invested.[2] In the meantime Russia's total indebtedness is $112.7 billion, and by the end of the year it will grow to 131 billion.[3] How are we going to pay our debts? After all, our per-capita indebtedness will soon reach $1,000—that is, considering our average wage, each Russian will have to work an entire year to pay off the foreign debt. Or will Russia be forced to declare itself insolvent?

It must be noted that immediately after the scandalous Budapest summit, representatives of the IMF hinted that Russia may not even get the credit that had been promised to it. But it was this credit that our government intended to use to cover this year's 42 percent budget deficit. Are the hints really so difficult discern?

At the same time Russian clients are holding $10-14 billion in their foreign bank accounts.[4] That is, investments are essentially flowing out of Russia to the West, and not vice versa. Moreover it is impossible to understand what has happened with the Soviet Union's debts, which exceeded our indebtedness to foreign states by 1.5 times three years ago. Why can't we get back at least part of this amount, why has Russia not been admitted to the Paris club of creditors, which provides help in meeting the debts of even the most inveterate defaulters?

Moscow can only observe the progress of European integration from the sidelines. In the meantime, despite all of the difficulties of implementing the Maastricht Agreement, "the process has begun moving," with Eastern European and Baltic states being drawn into its orbit more and more. We, however, have no real prospects for joining the European Union. Although Russia did finally sign a treaty with the European Union in summer 1994, calling for a five-year transition period for eliminating discrimination against Russian goods in the European market and laying the foundation for negotiations on concluding a free trade agreement by the end of the decade, after "Black Tuesday" in October 1994 the European Union's enthusiasm waned dramatically, and the treaty's ratification has been shelved, possibly for several years. As a result the idea arose to substitute the agreement by an extremely limited interim agreement.

This means that Russia's unequal position in Western markets will persist. This pertains not only to Europe but also to North America, where another superbloc is forming—NAFTA. Last year, of course, the COCOM—what was the main headquarters of the economic blockade against the Soviet Union over the last four decades—finally ceased to exist. But many of the discriminatory mechanisms survive at the national level. Moreover it seems as if there are no plans to invite Russia, on equal terms, into the new body that is to maintain supervision over export of dual-purpose technologies. We should add that Moscow never did become an equal member of the regime of control over export of rocket technology.

The results in the political and military-political directions are even more modest. Despite numerous attempts by Russian diplomacy, we aren't being allowed into the European Council. On the surface, there are many reasons for this. But it would be naive to expect that if we were to repeal our registration system and satisfy other requirements of this sort, we would be accepted

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there. The West's attitude toward the problem of the civil rights of the Russian population in Baltic states, which obtained membership in the European Council rather easily by the way, is indicative. All of the belated attempts by Russian diplomacy to bring attention to this problem turned out to be unsuccessful.

If Russia's nonparticipation in the Western European Union (WEU) is explainable, a generally incomprehensible situation has evolved in relation to other European associations. Moscow has of course retained its seat in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but Russia's role in this all-European forum hasn't been very noticeable for many long years. And it could hardly achieve much there, having no support from either former Eastern European allies or former Soviet republics. To be honest, Russian diplomacy is itself to blame in many ways: We ignored it for almost three years, focusing all of our attention on contacts with the West. Moreover, the weakness displayed by the CSCE (for example in the Karabakh conflict) could only evoke irritation in our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The outburst of activity displayed by Russia in December was probably hopelessly late. The NATO members clearly had no desire to transform the CSCE into the main mechanism of security on the scale of the entire European continent, and they do not intend to do so. In the best case, the agreement voiced in relation to transforming the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the summit talks in Budapest is only a diplomatic distraction by which to cover the decision to expand NATO. Although we cannot exclude the possibility that the OSCE will transform into the "first line of defense" for the North Atlantic alliance itself.

A most complex situation has arisen today in Russia's relations with NATO, which occupies the key position in the entire system of Western institutions. Following liquidation of the Soviet Union, which favored simultaneous disbanding of the two military blocs in Europe, the new Russian leadership clearly counted on membership in the North Atlantic alliance.

"Our desire to cooperate with this mechanism and join it is natural,"[5] said A. Kozyrev. As long as NATO was established to restrain communism and Soviet expansion, one would have thought that the new Russia's rejection of communism and the USSR's foreign policy made it possible not only to eliminate confrontation but also to establish the closest ties between the former adversaries, and to gain Russia's quick integration into the Western community.

But it immediately became clear that Russia would not be invited to join NATO. Having lost its foe, the North Atlantic alliance had to redefine the meaning of its existence. After all, inclusion of what was its chief adversary in the past into this organization would have made continuation of its activity as a system of collective defense (against whom?) impossible. Western countries didn't want to "rock the boat," and Russia's admission to NATO might have sharply disturbed the established balance of forces both within the European component of the North Atlantic alliance and between Europe and the United States. Such a radical shift created the threat that NATO would suffer the same fate as the Warsaw Pact.

The desire to preserve the mechanism for reconciling the interests of Western allies, which had been created with such great difficulty, prevailed over centrifugal tendencies. This predetermined the further evolution of NATO as the main military-political alliance of the West. And although Russia is no longer viewed as a direct adversary of the North Atlantic alliance, it continues to be perceived as something other than a component of the West.

In the United States and Western Europe, post-Soviet Russia is considered to be not only a country that is economically and politically different from the Western allies, but also still the largest military power in Europe. As the heir to a superpower, the Russian Federation inherited not only Soviet nuclear might but also the largest quota of conventional arms.

Of course, NATO welcomed the pro-Western orientation of the Russian leadership. However, even Russia's suggestion of the idea of joining this organization evoked an extremely nervous reaction. Russian diplomacy was forced to backpedal. "While we do not wish to raise the matter of Russia's entry into NATO today, we are prepared to view this as a long-term political goal"[6]—such was the wording of Moscow's official position. Instead of equal participation in NATO, Russia was forced to limit itself to a secondary role in the Council for North Atlantic Cooperation (CNAC) established under it. However, because of its stated purpose and its structure, this body, which is NATO's "dressing room," was and is unable to reach any serious objectives. And even Russia itself was essentially diluted within the CNAC among its five dozen participants, none (or almost none) of whom concealed the fact that it was interested in full membership in the North Atlantic alliance.

In early 1994 NATO presented its "Partnership for Peace" program, which opened the road to closer military-political cooperation both with Russia and with Eastern Europe. Moscow hastened to immediately announce its participation in the program, before the

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concrete conditions of this partnership were spelled out. Almost a year had to go by before Kozyrev was able to bring to Brussels the Russian variant of the agreement, which singled Russia out of the entire group of "Partnership" participants, foreseeing the possibility of more-equal partnership between NATO and Russia according to a "16+1" scheme. But it was already hopelessly too late.

It is clear today that relations with Russia, which is weak and unpredictable, no longer play a priority role for NATO. The main goal of Western leaders is to preserve the mechanism behind the system for coordinating military-political strategy within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance. Russia doesn't fit into this rather fragile system, in which it threatens to disturb the balance of forces established therein. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe yearning for NATO protection, especially the Vyshgorod group, are another matter. Moscow's protests evoked only irritation: How could present-day Russia possibly demand a "right of veto" in relation to NATO?

A consensus that admission of former Soviet Warsaw Pact allies into NATO over Russia's objections would be unavoidable evolved in the West toward the end of last year. Together with gradual integration of Eastern Europeans into the European Union, NATO's expansion was to put an end to the legacy of the Yalta system and provide an acceptable level of stability in the USSR's former zone of influence. This means that as a result of the Warsaw Pact's disintegration and withdrawal of Soviet troops, the buffer zone that had existed would disappear over the course of the next few years, and the two-bloc security system would be superseded in Europe not by a zero-bloc but a one-bloc system.

Thus in the last three-plus years Russia has essentially lost its possibility for seriously influencing the course of all-European processes. The direction, nature and rate of development of these processes have begun to be determined by the West. Naturally NATO found itself in the center of the new security system forming on the European continent, while Moscow found itself in practically complete isolation.

This fiasco came about not only because of the collapse of the Russian economy, but also due to the monumentally gross errors made by the creators of Russian foreign policy. Moscow lost all of its levers of political influence in Eastern Europe, for practical purposes consciously ignoring its former allies not only in military and political areas but also in the economic sphere. All former CEMA members are now reoriented upon the European Union, while Russia has managed to place itself in the role of debtor even to its former partners.

The relationship of factors defining military power changed as well. The Soviet Union was not only a nuclear "superpower," but it also possessed 60 percent of all conventional arms on the European continent. At the end of 1995 Russia will be left with approximately 15 percent of all arms according to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the 1992 Tashkent agreement on dividing up the Soviet quota. The balance of military forces in Europe between NATO, Eastern European states, former Soviet republics and Russia will be 3:1:1:1. Moreover a great deal of time will be needed for the Russian Army to restore its combat worthiness following the unprecedented relocation of troops from abroad to Russian territory.

Although memories of the military threat posed by Russia are still being revived in the West (and not only in the West), in reality we could hardly oppose NATO today in an all-European conflict. Moreover as events in Chechnya and around it show, even a relatively minor local border conflict requires extremely serious mobilization of forces by Moscow.

Of course, there is no real military threat today to Russia from outside (Chechnya is in Russia, after all). But there is another danger: collapse of the arms control regime established toward the end of the cold war, and at Moscow's fault at that.

Recall that this regime includes an entire series of treaties that are not formally associated with each other, and which in their aggregate were to ensure stability and equal security of the two superpowers and of the military-political blocs under their lead. These are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (OVSYe), the INF Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), agreements on chemical and biological arms, and parallel obligations of Moscow and Washington to reduce and destroy most tactical nuclear arms.

Only one treaty out of this complex has been fulfilled—INF. The rest are yet to be practically implemented, which will require major restructuring of armed forces and defense industry and, correspondingly, rather sizable outlays. But in our country, military reform was blocked, and matters in the military area were set free to develop as they may, according to the principle that "maybe things will sort themselves out." As a result, as in many other areas, no work was done on the old problems, and in the meantime a pile of new problems accumulated.

However, while we have now become accustomed to violating our internal obligations without remorse of conscience, in the international sphere the situation is different—treaties have to be fulfilled. Otherwise

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Russia would be forced to pay a huge price for an irresponsible attitude toward its obligations when the time for executing them expires.

Unfortunately we are forced to assert today that in the commotion of the last several years, Russia did nothing to fulfill a number of its obligations. This pertains chiefly to the agreements on chemical and biological arms. But while failure to observe these agreements does have at least some "objective" explanations (the production capacities have not been built), matters are different in regard to violation of the important limitations of the OVSYe Treaty. On 15 May 1992 the Russian Ministry of Defense agreed to divide the Soviet quota such that not less than three divisions could be maintained in the regular forces in the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts.

In reality, this level has already been surpassed in the Northern Caucasus, to which a number of formations had been withdrawn from Germany. Besides this, there are two divisional bases in Georgia and another in Armenia. Finally, the 14th Army—small in numerical strength but possessing huge arms depots—is in the Dnestr region, which is also on the southern flank.

It is difficult to imagine that NATO would agree to an increase in the Russian quota, on the whole or on the flanks. It is absolutely clear that Turkey, which has unexpectedly obtained a unique chance for "turning history backward," and which has transformed into a regional "superpower," would not agree with such a concession to Russia. And the Western allies have absolutely no burning desire to place any pressure on Ankara.

Escalation of the conflict in Chechnya makes probable a protracted military conflict in the Northern Caucasus—that is, an unavoidable overshoot of the Russian quota. This means that in a year, Moscow will be officially recognized to be in violation of the OVSYe Treaty. It would not be difficult to predict NATO's reaction (and not only NATO's, but that of all Europe).

There is also a new problem arising with the OVSYe Treaty today. After all, as with all other arms control agreements concluded at the end of the cold war, it was based on the principle of parity between the two sides. In the meantime the Warsaw Pact had long ceased to exist. What will happen if former Warsaw Pact members join NATO? Does this mean that the aggregate level established for NATO would be surpassed, and that the North Atlantic bloc would thereby be in violation of this treaty?

It seems that this variant sits well with some people in our country. There is good reason why people are beginning to say that NATO's fastest possible expansion would relieve us of our obligation to adhere to the levels of the OVSYe Treaty not only on the southern flank but also in general. Moreover, it could hardly be denied that Russia is simply unable to physically maintain parity in conventional arms with NATO (and even more so if several of the Eastern European states are included in its membership). However, people are beginning to conclude from this that we need to place even greater reliance upon nuclear deterrence.

In this case Russia's strategic nuclear arms are not the only item under discussion. Emphasis is being laid on tactical nuclear weapons, and the question of operational-range missiles destroyed under the INF Treaty is being raised. That is, were NATO to expand, Russia could begin producing a new generation of SS-20 missiles and other systems prohibited under it. Of course, one-sided dissolution of the Soviet-American INF Treaty would evoke an extremely sharp reaction from the United States. The START-1 Treaty would also be brought into question.

Unfortunately the 1992 Lisbon Protocol equated Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan with Russia as heirs to the USSR under this treaty. Ukraine dragged its heels, and it was in no hurry to become nonnuclear, and even Kiev's recent consent to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is once again hedged by ambiguous qualifications. In Budapest, in the meantime, Russia agreed to announce enactment of the START-1 Treaty, even though Ukraine continues to insist upon its right of ownership of strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory.

This situation considerably complicates the prospects for ratifying the START-2 Treaty, signed by presidents Yeltsin and Bush in 1993. The difficulties are associated not only with the problems of dividing up the Soviet nuclear legacy, but also with the high cost of the proposed reductions. However, the main thing is the inconsistency between the declared strategic partnership between Russia and the United States, and persistence of the model of mutual nuclear deterrence in relations between the two powers.

This contradiction cannot be resolved by symbolic measures having the purpose of camouflaging continuing nuclear opposition. After all, the readiness to immediately annihilate the other side is the essence of mutual nuclear deterrence. Russian military doctrine pronounced in fall 1992 lays emphasis on nuclear deterrence and even foresees rejection of the Soviet promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Rejection of this model is possible only if Russia and the United States transcend to a real and not just a declared partner-

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ship. Consequently announcement of accelerated stand-down of all systems to be destroyed by 2003 according to the START-2 Treaty, made during the September summit talks in Washington, was a surprise. After all, in this case the balance of forces may change dramatically, and not in Russia's favor. It may be that such a turn will make its ratification more difficult, rather than making it easier.

It appears that Russia might make yet another mistake by agreeing to make the ABM Treaty multilateral. After all, by doing so it would weaken Russia's unique status in relation to the United States, which in many ways determines our country's place in the present system of international relations. Moreover, reexamination of the ABM Treaty, especially with an eye on blurring the boundaries between strategic systems and tactical systems (ABM defense in a theater of military operations) would have serious military consequences. The reliability of Russian nuclear deterrence could be threatened.

In any case the "mature strategic partnership" between Russia and the United States proclaimed by presidents Yeltsin and Clinton is already experiencing a deep crisis. And this is understandable: Declarations that are not supported by specific acts become unfulfilled hopes. Strategic partnership cannot be effective unless a mechanism of close military-political interaction is created.

Russia and the United States could be united by important strategic interests, by their common interest in maintaining stability and security in the world. It would not be advantageous to either power or any third power to assume a dominant position in the system of international relations. However, Moscow and Washington have still been unable to develop a system by which to achieve consensus on their interests, and to reconcile them. As a result disagreements have started surfacing, first in secondary and then in more-important issues.

It appears that the historical chance for establishing Russian-American partnership may slip away. Responsibility for this lies to a significant degree with Moscow, which has been found to be incapable of offering a realistic program for development of relations with Washington, conceding the initiative almost wholly and entirely to the American side. This readiness of Russian diplomacy to recognize the United States' undisputed leadership has not been without its consequences: The Americans have begun getting used to the idea that Russia could be presented with a *fait accompli*. Ultimately the desire to maintain Western solidarity at any price will have the consequence that the United States will reckon less and less with Russian interests. Moscow's belated attempts to change this nature of the advertised partnership have only evoked irritation in Washington.

The atmosphere in Russian-American relations deteriorated noticeably in recent months. It may be assumed that with the transfer of power in Congress to conservative Republicans, U.S. Russian policy will grow significantly stiffer. In any case the Clinton administration is not going to give up its plans to widen NATO just because Moscow refused to sign the agreement on "Partnership for Peace." Russian-American differences made public in the Budapest meeting may become the starting point of dangerous alienation between Russia and the United States.

The clumsy attempts by Russian diplomacy to play upon the internal contradictions in the West, particularly in order to find a counterweight to the United States, will perhaps only intensify even more the notion that Russia is a weak and unpredictable partner that makes excessive claims.

It is an irony of history that upon ending the Soviet-American cold war, the former rivals have once again returned to their initial dispute. After all, having rejected a global role, Russia is attempting to stake out the boundaries of its special interests, while the United States and the West as a whole are refusing to recognize such a zone not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In Budapest, Clinton rejected Russian claims upon a "right of veto" and a "zone of interests," and Yeltsin condemned the desire to control the course of events "from a single capital."

Could the growing alienation of Russia and the West mean a return to cold war? Hardly, because Russia doesn't have the resources with which to enter into a new arms race. Nor is there an ideological basis for such a confrontation. But there is a fully realistic prospect for transition to a "cold peace," which President Yeltsin discussed at the CSCE summit.

Russia's policy in relation to former Soviet republics might perhaps have the decisive significance in this situation. However, intensification of economic, political and military pressure by Moscow with the goal of maintaining its zone of special interests in the CIS will be interpreted in the West as a return to an imperialistic policy.

Progressing isolation of Russia from the West—if it goes too far—will doubtlessly have a negative effect both on market reforms and on democratic political transformations. In turn, intensification of authoritarian counter-reformist tendencies in Russia will lead to even greater isolation of Russia, going as far as creation of a

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new "quarantine zone." Thus growing apprehensions in the West that Russia may assume an expansionist path may play the role of a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

Is There a Way Out?

As the old truism has it, foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. The necessity for stabilization inside a country also means correction of foreign policy, which must be realistic, and which must ensure, in more than just words, favorable external conditions for the necessary economic and political reforms.

The main threat today is that we might go from one extreme to the other, and assume the traditional path of authoritarianism in domestic policy and confrontation with the outside world. What are we going to do after slamming all of the doors shut? Russian neo-isolationism is a path to a "camp under siege," together with all of its "delights."

But in the new geopolitical situation, in which Russia has been stripped of its allies, it could hardly become a great power, and it will inevitably transform into an object of expansion for other centers of power. Twenty-first century Russia cannot be 19th century America, separated from the surrounding world by two oceans. We are in fact a Eurasian power, and we must deal simultaneously with all of the main centers of power in the modern world—the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China and the Islamic world. But for the moment the only expression of our "Eurasianism" is that we have found ourselves isolated both in Europe and in Asia. Can we survive in a multipolar world if we have neither allies nor partners?

Moscow needs a foreign policy that would make it possible to ensure peace on our borders, avoid international isolation, and defend our interests with the help of dependable partners in regions having vitally important significance to us.

What must be done to achieve this?

1. Now that the first cycle of Russian foreign policy has ended with bankruptcy of its open pro-Western orientation, and the authors of this course are hastily distancing itself from it rather than admitting responsibility for the defeat, it is time to reach the conclusion that the present creators of our foreign policy are incapable of finding a way out of the dead end they themselves created. The absence of a thoughtful strategy, incompetency, improvisations and posing may conclusively discredit Russian diplomacy both at home and abroad.

2. It is finally time to clearly define the foreign political priorities of our state, and to stop swinging between globalism and isolationism. The first circle of Russia's interests is the CIS, the second circle is our neighbors in the Far East, in the Near East, and in Eastern Europe, and the West is only the third circle. Under no conditions should we isolate ourselves from the United States and Western Europe, but we need to begin our policy in the near abroad, not the far abroad.

3. Our interests in Eastern Europe will be conclusively undermined if we allow the desire of these states to join NATO to transform into an excuse for creating a new iron curtain. We still have the possibility, after all, to at least partially restore mutual economic cooperation with a number of Eastern European countries. And there are other areas in which our interests coincide. It would be sufficient to recall that cooperation with Poland is necessary in order to avoid transformation of Kaliningrad into a new Danzig.

4. Russia must avoid extremes in its relations with the West. Inasmuch as expansion of NATO can no longer be avoided, the question of formulating our relations with the North Atlantic alliance is acquiring decisive importance. If this is to be a truly equal partnership, why must NATO necessarily be perceived as a threat? Can we not imagine a variant of NATO's evolution in which this organization's growing strength would be in our interests, rather than contradicting them?

Obviously we can get the ultimate answer to this question by attempting to offer NATO cooperation under the terms of a mutual compromise—recognition of one another's lawful interests, rather than unilateral concessions by Russia. Clearly there are three directions of interaction here.

First, we need to update the arms control regime, which is based on the obsolete principle of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Expansion of NATO must lead not to a new arms race but to a decrease of the persisting high level of militarization in Europe. Rather than floundering in the wake of events, we need to take the initiative into our own hands, for example by proposing a new Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (OVSYe-2) to replace the OVSYe Treaty. The OVSYe-2 Treaty must substitute bloc-based arms levels by national limits. All European states, and not just members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, must become its participants. We cannot allow the aggregate levels of arms foreseen for NATO to increase as a result of this bloc's expansion. And the new treaty must concluded under the auspices of the OSCE, which will become a noticeable contribution by the new organization to ensuring security and cooperation on the European continent.

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Second, we need a sound contractual basis for relations between Russia and NATO in relation to a wide range of political and military problems. We could require NATO to recognize Russia's lawful security interests in a number of concrete spheres in connection with expansion of this alliance. Besides issues delimited in the "Partnership for Peace" program, the possible obligations of NATO should have a relationship to problems such as not locating foreign military bases and nuclear weapons in Eastern European states, not expanding the activity of the joint military organization of the North Atlantic bloc to the territory of Baltic states and other former Soviet republics, and Russia's equal participation in programs of material and technical support to the armed forces of former countries of the Warsaw Pact that may become NATO members. Moreover Russian conditions might include the requirement to hand the entire complex of problems associated with peacekeeping operations in Europe over to the exclusive jurisdiction of the OSCE. And finally, the final dissolution of the Yalta system must not have an impact on the Kaliningrad question. It is fully logical that if NATO is to expand, the present borders of the Russian Federation must be guaranteed.

Third, the new architecture of Europe also requires formal establishment of relations along NATO-CIS lines—in any case, organization of collective security on the basis of the 15 May 1992 Tashkent agreement. Naturally there can be no discussion of institutionalizing the principle of parity in relations between them. An agreement between NATO and CIS must document the principles and directions of cooperation between the two organizations in maintaining international security, rather than duplicating the OVSYe-2 Treaty. At the same time, adoption of a new program of measures of trust in the military sphere is also possible.

5. We need to reformulate the principles of strategic partnership with the United States, and move away from the "leader-follower" formula. Equal partnership presupposes presence of shared interests, a mechanism for consultations in decision making, and bodies for permanent interaction at the working level. We need to create such a structure of interaction, capitalizing upon the United States' interest in resolving a number of international issues.

6. The new strategic initiatives of Russian diplomacy could be successful only if Russia is able to find a way out of the economic crisis and provide for internal political stability. The hopes for a "diplomatic miracle" will prove groundless if Russia continues to weaken in all directions. It is time to understand that Russia is under no circumstances "doomed to being a great power." Continuation of the present trends will doom Russia to slipping into the backwaters of world policy. But the possibilities for rebirth, for transformation into a truly great power do exist. And we mustn't let them slip away.

Footnotes

1. DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK, 15 January 1992, p 12.

2. SEGODNYA, 22 November 1994.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK, 15 January 1992, p 11.

6. Ibid., pp 12-13.

Kozyrev Remarks on Helping Compatriots Viewed

954Q0177A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian Apr 95 No 17, [Signed to press 25 Apr 95] pp 9-11

[Article by Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya, under rubric "Response": "Four Steps Forward and One Step Back: The minister of foreign affairs has executed a remarkable dance with regard to the use of armed force to defend his compatriots"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Four times during the week, in order for even the deaf and the dim-witted to get the point, Kozyrev made a frightening incantation: in defending her compatriots, Russia is ready to apply force, including direct armed force. The responses were so thoroughly unpleasant that on Friday, 21 April, at a session of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Commanders of the Border Troops of the CIS Countries, the minister explained his position, but it was in such an artificial, unconvincing, and awkward way that he probably only aggravated the impression produced by his previous statements. Actually, the first one of them was made at a session of the Council on Foreign Policy that was devoted not to the attack on Russian citizens by sea pirates, but to the position of the Russian-speaking minority in the former Soviet republics.

Presidential Mouthpiece

Politicians typically repeat themselves, and this is certainly not the first time that the world has heard the threat of using force. The Russian Talleyrand, however, has been moving across the international parquet too long to allow himself such a risky entrechat instinctively or as a result of his overpowering sympathy for some former Soviet citizens who are currently being oppressed by other former Soviet citizens. Therefore in

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the minister's latest action one's attention is immediately drawn by the importunity of the repetitions and their timing.

Commenting on them, politicians and the press have isolated chiefly two circumstances. First, the fact that, for all the apparent arrogance of his demarches, Andrey Kozyrev is acting in this instance not as an independent figure, but only as Boris Yeltsin's mouthpiece. The limited nature of the maneuvers of the head of Russian diplomacy is explained not only by the fact that, according to the current constitution, foreign policy is the president's domain. In Russia, it is said, foreign ministers have been, since time immemorial, figures on the tsar's chessboard; and although the sovereigns at times played poorly, they were all we had. Secondly, everyone, beginning with former close friend Klaus Kinkel and ending with the rank-and-file journalist, has linked the metal in Kozyrev's voice with the beginning of the election campaign.

The reference to historical tradition is not an argument, but, rather, a departure from an explanation, even with respect to a Russia that is attempting with such great effort to tear itself out of the vicious cycle of despotism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. As for the pre-election fever, most politicians actually consider their constituents to be forgetful idiots who are ready each time to take the bait that has been prepared for them. It is only a question of choosing the kind of bait to use this time.

In the situation with Andrey Kozyrev's statements, that bait is the force and power of a state that is allegedly protecting the interests of its citizens and that, for the sake of their defense, is ready to activate all means, up to and including the extreme ones. Russian citizens undoubtedly need protection. And it is not protection against any mythical "pirates" on board a ship sailing somewhere in the World Ocean, but primarily social protection or effective, rather than verbal, protection against crime. But in the last two areas, the situation is so bad that the "party of power" is simply incapable of putting them in the center of the electoral program. It is much simpler to hurl thunderclaps and lightning, by threatening one's current and former neighbors.

The rhetoric of force is a derivative and result of the weaknesses of domestic policy, an attempt to compensate for them for the voter by making great-power speeches and gestures. It is a political bluff that has been often repeated in history. It is a banal, but very dangerous, one. Because the ones who will pay the bloody bills are the boys in uniform.

Replying to one of the persons who spoke at the session of the Council on Foreign Policy, Andrey Kozyrev remarked that the arsenal of means necessary to protect compatriots is, in the abstract form, well known: from the expression of weak dissatisfaction in a statement made by one of the anonymous representatives of the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], to the application of force. Force not only of a political or economic nature, but also direct armed force. "There may be instances," the minister said, "when it is necessary to use armed force to protect our citizens abroad and to protect our fellow countrymen." In his opinion, one of the means should be elevated to an absolute. It is important, without giving in to emotions, to use the entire arsenal of means of international pressure. However, the practice of recent years has shown that, within the confines of the former Soviet Union, there are a rather large number of situations the resolution of which by political means is very difficult for diplomats. As a result, they are resolved with the aid of unconcealed pressure by force or even the direct application of armed force. That is why Kozyrev's views were understood precisely in this context both in Russia and outside its confines. After the Groznyy apocalypse and the military operations that are heating up on the Tajik border, not a single sensible or cautious politician will continue to believe that the head of Russian diplomacy was motivated only by touching concern for compatriots making sea voyages.

Kozyrev in the Singular

"Well, people will start saying again that there are two Kozyrevs," the minister remarked after getting the first responses to his statements. No, they won't do that anymore. Even those who at first harbored certain illusions concerning his political credo have had sufficient time to reject them. But, most importantly, the head of Russian diplomacy is completely sincere when he states, for example, that he has always been in the singular. Actually, in early 1992, at the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations] practical-scientific conference "A Reformed Russia in the New World," the minister employed the concept "superpower," understanding it, it must be said, in a more limited way than currently: "We shall remain a superpower in the sphere of spiritual culture going back many centuries, and of human and natural resources. We no longer intend to plod through the quagmire of the 'third path,' but we also do not want to dissolve among our new friends. Partnership and friendship definitely do not presuppose the consigning to oblivion of one's own geopolitical, economic, or other national interests, and we shall defend them." President Yeltsin's message, which the minister had brought with him, also mentioned that "transformed Russia, as a great power, is already making its contribution to the creation of a new world order."

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A politician who grasps onto Russia's status as a great power or as a superpower, deliberately or against his own will takes the path of inexorable evolution that is dictated by stern political logic. Less than one year after the conference in the "Stockholm farce," Andrey Kozyrev formulates in this manner one of the principles of Russian nationalism in the sphere of foreign policy: "The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be viewed as a zone for the complete application of the CSCE norms. It is, in essence, post-imperial space where Russia will have to defend her interests with the use of all the accessible means, including military and economic ones." That is precisely the principle that has silently guided the minister in his relations with the CIS countries as a minimum for the past two years. But now, as a result of the sharp aggravation of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, he has launched a trial balloon and has attempted openly to legalize the principle of the legality of the application of military force. The idea was met by bayonets, and the minister withdrew, attempting to heap the responsibility on the journalists who, he said, were making a mountain out of a molehill by inflating to the point of incredibility a casually dropped phrase that does not have any mandatory force. Most likely, Kozyrev renounced his own words because currently, when, in observance of Victory Day, "all the flags will be visiting us," his soundings have proven to be too inopportune. But when the guests go back home, everything will be visible again. For the time being, however, we need peace and quiet, and God's Grace both in Chechnya and in Central Asia.

The "patriots" did not accept Kozyrev openly because for them he embodied the Americanism that they hate. Meanwhile, American globalism and the transformed Soviet-Russian great-powerism are twin brothers. That apparently is what explains Andrey Kozyrev's attempts, with all his strength, to remain on equal terms with the Americans and to copy the power principles of their diplomacy. Our former homeland already has overstrained itself once on this policy, but that apparently did not teach anything to anyone in the Kremlin or on Smolenskaya Ploshchad.

Trial balloons and the policy of restrainment

The hazy, all-encompassing form in which Kozyrev launched his trial balloon permits various interpretations. With a consideration of the minister's recent explanations, that form can completely include within itself not only the infringement of the interests of the military retirees in the Baltic countries, but also a certain episode of the type of the beating up of Russian tourists at the East Station in Warsaw. When, in November of last year, the conflict with Warsaw coincided in time with the signing by Boris Yeltsin of the edict on the emergency measures to protect Russian citizens, the assertions by the official agencies to the effect that that directive pertains only to personnel in the foreign diplomatic services seemed to be convincing, and the panic that had broken out in Poland proved to be absurdly unfounded. Kozyrev's current pirouettes force one to look at the matter differently. They provide a new argument for the Central European and Baltic states for a new "spring offensive" against NATO, with a demand to be included as rapidly as possible in its ranks, thus guaranteeing them security against the Eastern giant's risky escapades.

Russian politicians, like their Soviet predecessors, apparently are incapable of withstanding temptation or failing to take advantage of the weakness of a neighbor or former vassal. This is completely apparent in the example of the recent policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Correspondingly, one should not hope that the states that have firmly resolved to retain the sovereignty that has been acquired will await their fate passively. It is obvious that they will begin to use all the means accessible to them to strive for a new edition of the policy of restraining Russia. From their point of view, this is a completely rational course.

In Moscow, however, as has already become completely clear now, any steps in that direction will be used to heap the responsibility for the unfriendly chain reaction in international relations on others — the Poles, the Balts, the Tajik opposition, etc. Isn't it, finally, time to turn toward oneself? That time came long ago, but it must regrettably be stated that the chances of such a reasonable turn are practically equal to zero. Since, of course, it is not Andrey Kozyrev, but the president, who sets the tone in Russian diplomacy, and therefore the long-lived minister's trial balloons deserve doubled attention.

Lukin Comments on Kozyrev Remarks

954Q0177B Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian Apr 95 No 17, [Signed to press 25 Apr 95] p 11

[Interview with V. Lukin by I. Ryabov: "Hold a Club, Rather Than 'the Finger': The foreign minister is right, but he should not talk about this"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Vladimir Lukin, Andrey Kozyrev's ancient opponent and the chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, answers questions asked by NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent Igor Ryabov.**

[Ryabov] Can your comment addressed to Andrey Kozyrev that "the state's forces are becoming less and

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less, and the number of power ministers is becoming greater and greater" be evaluated as criticism of his statements?

[Lukin] I do not want to say that we should not intercede for our compatriots. But it is not the foreign minister's job to shake his fists. How can one speak sharp words and then count on success in negotiations? That is what happened at the Tajik meeting. The foreign minister is a negotiator and peace-maker, rather than a propagandist-agitator. This is bad, first of all, for the country.

It is necessary to take two paths to defend the interests of compatriots abroad. Nothing new has been invented since Machiavelli's time. It is the "carrot and the stick," rather than the "whistle."

The "stick" must be well packed and must be used in the rarest instances. There must be well-equipped special forces to respond to the emergency situation if suddenly people begin killing our compatriots abroad. We have such forces in readiness. But we ought not to make any special effort to shout or "blow the whistle" about this.

I am speaking only about the most extreme situations. The less frequently we use such forces, the better we will be ready to do that. But economic, or political-economic, opportunities are not an extreme situation. We cannot use them, for example, with respect to Latin America, but we can use them with respect to the nearby states. But other people, rather than the foreign minister, should engage in them.

The "carrots" are those same economic opportunities, incentive, the granting of greater cultural opportunities.

The person who can exert an effect is the one who speaks quietly, but who keeps a big club in his pocket. Rather than the one who speaks in a shrill voice, but conceals "the finger" [crude hand gesture] in his pocket.

[Ryabov] Do you mean, then, that Kozyrev is right, but that he ought not to have mentioned that at this time?

[Lukin] Definitely. Kozyrev is right in the sense that the problem of our compatriots does exist. And that we should have a system of actions aimed at protecting them. But he is completely wrong in how he is attempting to do that.

The impression is created that this "whistle" is directed at the election campaign. If Kozyrev wants to defend his compatriots, where was he earlier? He is simply someone who adapts to the current situation. He has perceived how it is possible to gain an advantage. In that sense he is not different from Zhirinovskiy in any way.

*Text of Russian-Belarusian Friendship, Cooperation Treaty

954Q0176A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian Mar 95
No 3, [Signed to press 23 Mar 95] pp 38-42

[Text of "Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, hereinafter called the Signatories,

taking into account the close ties which have historically developed between their peoples,

believing that further strengthening of friendly relations, good neighborliness, and mutually advantageous cooperation is in the fundamental interests of the peoples of both states and serves the cause of peace and security,

noting that the Treaty between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic dated 18 December 1990 played its historical role,

convinced of the need to continue building sovereign democratic states with a socially oriented market economy and in all possible ways promoting the creation of a unified economic space,

striving to give new quality to their relations and strengthen the legal basis of cooperation with consideration of the profound political and economic changes in both states and trends of international life,

proceeding from the desire to build bilateral relations based on mutual trust, equality, trust, accord, and partnership,

confirming their devotion to the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter, the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

and bearing in mind the obligations of their states within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

have reached an understanding as follows below:

Article 1

The Signatories will build friendly, good neighborly relations and develop cooperation, guided by the principles of mutual respect of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of

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disputes and non-use of force or threat of force, equality and nonintervention in internal affairs, observance of human rights and basic liberties, and conscientious fulfillment of obligations, as well as other generally recognized principles and norms of international law.

Article 2

The Signatories will cooperate closely in an effort to preserve peace, reinforce stability, and ensure regional and global security.

They will coordinate their foreign policy activity, devoting priority attention to creating a system of collective security in the world and on the European Continent, strengthening the UN's peacekeeping role and its interaction with European regional and subregional organizations, forums, and agreements, assisting in settling interstate and other conflicts which affect their interests, and continuing to advance the process of reducing armed forces and armaments.

Article 3

The Signatories will hold regular consultations on various levels in an effort to ensure the continued development and deepening of their bilateral relations and the exchange of opinions on international issues of mutual interest.

Meetings on the interstate level will as a rule be conducted every year when necessary and feasible.

The ministers of foreign affairs will hold regular consultations on issues of mutual interest.

When necessary and with mutual consent, the Signatories will hold regular working meetings and consultations of the leaders of the central organs of state government, as well as of leaders of various levels, in an effort to ensure the continued development and deepening of bilateral relations and the exchange of opinions on international and other issues of mutual interest.

The Signatories will create mixed commissions on a permanent or temporary basis to resolve individual questions in different areas.

Article 4

In conditions of open borders between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, on their own borders with third states the Signatories will carry out the appropriate measures to ensure one another's security and cooperate with them on the basis of individual agreements to resolve border questions.

They will coordinate and take the necessary measures to ensure mutual visa-free entry, visiting, and departure of citizens of one state on the other's territory.

They will also agree upon a regime for entry, visiting, and departure of citizens of third countries on the Signatories' territories.

Article 5

The Signatories will carry on coordination of activities in the military field in accordance with individual agreements.

In the event of an armed attack on one of the Signatories or the threat of such an attack, the Signatories will consult with one another and take other measures with consideration of the obligations under the Collective Security Treaty dated 15 May 1992 and other treaties in which they participate.

Each of the Signatories will refrain from participating or supporting any actions at all directed against the other Signatory and obligates itself not to conclude any treaties directed against the other Signatory.

Neither of the Signatories will allow its territory to be used to impair the security of the other Signatory.

Article 6

The Signatories will promote expanded parliamentary ties between them.

Article 7

The Signatories will ensure favorable conditions for direct ties and comprehensive cooperation on the level of the administrative-territorial units within the framework of their competence.

They will promote the development of trade-economic ties between the border territories of both states.

Article 8

The Signatories will promote the development of comprehensive contacts among their citizens, political parties and movements, trade unions, youth, religious, sports, and other associations and unions, and organs of press and information.

Article 9

The Signatories will coordinate the basic directions for implementing economic reforms and promote deeper economic integration between them and the creation of conditions for forming a unified economic space in accordance with the obligations stemming from bilateral and multilateral treaties signed within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

For these purposes, they will coordinate financial, monetary-credit, budget, hard currency, investment,

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price, tax, payment-settlement, and customs policies, create equal opportunity and conditions for economic subjects, and promote the creation of financial-industrial groups and cooperation of enterprises, associations, and banks and producers and consumers of output based on free traffic in goods, services, capital, and work force.

The Signatories will promote the preservation and development on a mutually advantageous basis of production and scientific-technical cooperation between economic subjects when developing and producing contemporary high-tech output, including output for defense needs.

They will promote mutually advantageous cooperation in the area of construction and architecture on the basis of individual agreements.

Article 10

The Signatories will deepen mutually advantageous cooperation in the field of national power engineering and transport systems and communications systems, telecommunications, and information science, promoting the preservation, rational use, and development of complexes and unified systems which have taken shape in these areas.

Shipping of freight and passenger traffic by railway, air, river, and motor vehicle transport between both Signatories and transit across their territories, including operations through air and river ports and railway and motor vehicle networks, as well as operations through communication lines, main pipelines, and main power lines located on the other Signatory's territory, will be carried on under conditions and in a manner determined by individual agreements.

Article 11

The Signatories will strengthen cooperation in the field of labor and employment of the population, use of labor resources, and regulation of labor migration.

For these purposes, they will conclude individual agreements to regulate the processes of migration of citizens, migration of work force, and mutual obligations to ensure equal opportunities in the sphere of job placement and to offer social guarantees to citizens and members of their families of one of the Signatories located under lawful conditions on the other Signatory's territory.

Article 12

The Signatories will carry on close cooperation in the field of protection and improvement of the condition of the environment, prevention of transborder pollution, and rational and resource-saving use of nature on the basis of individual agreements.

They will provide reciprocal aid in preventing and eliminating on their territories the consequences of natural disasters, serious accidents, and the catastrophe at the Chernobyl AES [atomic power plant].

Article 13

The Signatories will cooperate in the area of basic and applied sciences, including industrial research and mutual utilization of the achievements of modern science, engineering, and technology, while complying with their laws and international obligations in the area of intellectual and industrial property.

They will promote deeper contacts between their national academies and other scientific institutions, carry on development of the joint infrastructure which ensures innovative activity, provide assistance in the creation and activity of joint scientific-production collectives, ensure the development and creation of a unified information network in the scientific-technical sphere, encourage the implementation of common programs and projects and the exchange of scientists, specialists, experts, and on-the-job trainees, and create favorable conditions for the work of training scientific cadres.

Article 14

The Signatories will carry on equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation in the area of education and training and retraining of cadres. For this purpose, they will promote extensive development of direct ties between educational institutions and scientific organizations of higher education and the exchange of specialists for teaching work, upgrading of skills and giving of lectures, and joint conduct of scientific research, topical conferences, symposiums, and seminars, as well as the exchange of pupils, students, graduate students, and on-the-job trainees. On a reciprocal basis, they will recognize the equivalency of documents on education and academic degrees and academic titles and will conclude an individual agreement on this issue.

Each of the Signatories will encourage the study of the languages, literature, art, and culture of the other Signatory.

Article 15

Relying on the traditions of close cultural ties, the Signatories will use all possible means to strengthen cooperation in various areas of culture and promote expanded practical contacts between creative unions and associations, cultural institutions, and figures of literature and art on the state, regional, and local levels.

Based on the mutual desire to become familiar with one another's culture and humanitarian values, they

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will conclude an agreement on the opening, status, and activities of their own cultural information centers on the territories of both states.

Article 16

The Signatories will develop cooperation in the areas of health care, sanitary-epidemiological oversight, protection of labor, social protection, and pension support.

Article 17

Each of the Signatories protects the rights and interests of its citizens living on the other Signatory's territory and provides patronage and support in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law and agreements adopted within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as obligations within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The legal status of the citizens of one Signatory who live permanently on the other Signatory's territory will be regulated by an agreement whereby these citizens will enjoy the same rights as the citizens of the Signatory on whose territory they live, with the exceptions established by this agreement.

Article 18

Each of the Signatories guarantees persons who consider themselves part of the Russian minority in the Republic of Belarus or part of the Belorussian minority in the Russian Federation the right to freely and individually or collectively express, preserve, and develop their unique ethnic, language, cultural, and religious qualities, without being subjected to any attempts at assimilation against their will.

Each of the Signatories obligates itself to take the appropriate measures on its territory, including legislative measures, to prevent and stop the threat or acts of violence, discrimination, or hostility toward persons who consider themselves in the minorities mentioned by reason of their ethnic, language, cultural, or religious affiliation.

Article 19

The Signatories will cooperate in measures to fight various types of crime, including organized crime, terrorism, acts directed against safe travel on all kinds of transport, illegal trafficking in narcotics, weapons, or nuclear fissionable materials, contraband, and illegal migration, as well as on questions of detaining and returning cultural treasures which have been illegally exported or imported.

Article 20

The Signatories will conduct regular bilateral consultations on questions involving the realization of the present Treaty.

A Joint Interstate Commission is created for this purpose. The procedure for forming it and its activity will be determined by a separate protocol.

Article 21

The present Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the Signatories stemming from other international treaties in which they participate.

Article 22

Disputes regarding the interpretation and execution of the present Treaty are to be resolved through consultations and negotiations between the Signatories.

Article 23

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and goes into force on the day instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Article 24

From the day the present Treaty goes into force, the Treaty between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic dated 18 December 1990 ceases to be valid.

Article 25

The present Treaty will be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of this organization's Charter.

Article 26

The present Treaty is concluded for a term of 10 years.

The Treaty's effect will be automatically extended for the subsequent 10-year terms if neither one of the Signatories gives notice to the other Signatory through written notification of its desire to terminate the Treaty's effect no later than 6 months before the term runs out.

Done in Minsk on 21 February 1995 in two copies, each in the Russian and Belorussian languages; both texts have equal force.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,

B. YELTSIN

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS,

A. LUKASHENKO

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***New Ambassador to Bolivia Appointed**

954Q0176B Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian Mar 95 No 3, [Signed to press 23 Mar 95] p 55

[Text of notice: "New Appointments, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yuriy Yuryevich NOSENKO** has been appointed Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Bolivia.

Yu. Yu. Nosenko was born in 1937 and is a Russian. He graduated from Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1967. He knows the Spanish and English languages.

He has been in the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] system since 1967. He worked in various diplomatic posts abroad and in the MID central apparat in 1967-1991. Since 1992 he has been deputy chief of administration of the MID Rossii [Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Department of Central and South America.

He has the diplomatic rank of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy, First Grade.

***Memorandum on Principles for Forming Trilateral Customs Union**

954E0931A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 13

[Article: "Memorandum of the Governments of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation Concerning Participation by Other Interested Economic Union States in the Triple Customs Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation view the Agreement on the Formation of a Customs Union as a very important part of the 24 September 1994 Treaty on the Creation of the Economic Union. The accelerated formation of the single customs space of the three states was influenced by the recently achieved considerable rapprochement of the system of administering their economies and of their economic legislation.

In conformity with the agreement, the triple Customs Union will be formed in two stages. The first stage will abolish tariff and quantitative limitations in the trade among the participants in the triple Customs Union, and will establish identical trade conditions, common customs tariffs, and measures for nontariff regulation with respect to third countries. The second stage will unite the customs territories of the three states into a single customs territory; customs control will be transferred from the internal boundaries among them to the external boundaries of the Customs Union. An executive agency of the Customs Union will be formed to carry out the joint administration of these processes.

The governments of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation feel that, at the first stage in the formation of the triple Customs Union, provision is made for the creation of a number of conditions, the fulfillment of which will make it possible to form a single customs space. They include:

— the achievement of coordination in carrying out economic reforms and in the creation of a standard management mechanism, based on market principles, for regulating the economy; the providing of equal opportunities and guarantees for all the subjects of economic activity in the states participating in the Customs Union;

— the unification of foreign-trade, customs, currency-finance, price, tax, and other economic legislation;

— the development of general rules for organizing the currency markets in the states participating in the Customs Union, and for providing access to them by authorized banks; the application of a currency exchange rate that is formed in conformity with supply and demand; the achievement of the mutual convertibility of the national currencies and the formation of effective payments of relations; the providing of uniform rules for providing the access of authorized banks to domestic markets;

— the carrying out of a coordinated foreign-economic policy with respect to third countries; the providing of the effective joint guarding of the external boundaries of the states participating in the Customs Union under conditions of the openness of the boundaries among them;

— the possibility of the mutual use of military objectives and structures on terms established for the national armed forces, as well as the joint operation of objectives of defense importance.

The heads of government of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation proceed from the assumption that, as these conditions are fulfilled, other states that are participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States may also participate in the Customs Union, which situation corresponds to the common interests of the participants in the Treaty on the Creation of the Economic Union.

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***Deputy Foreign Economic Minister Gabuniya on CIS Integration**

954E0931B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 13

[Article, "recorded by Aleksandr Shinkich," by Georgiy Gabuniya, deputy minister of foreign economic relations: "Integration at Various Speeds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For a long time after the collapse of the Union, we sought ways to integrate the CIS countries under the new conditions. And the more time that passed, the farther the "national independence," "economic independence," and "our own approaches to market reforms" separated the republics that at one time represented practically a single economic mechanism. Various barriers erected on the boundaries of the republic disrupted the previously well-coordinated ties and aggravated even more the economic crisis that prevailed everywhere.

Everyone understood that. However, it proved to be an extremely complicated job to unite all the CIS countries and bring them to some kind of agreement. Although documents were signed and slogans concerning the reinforcement of the mutual ties were announced. But many of the signed documents have continued to be what is called a protocol of intentions. Their execution, to a certain degree, collided with the republics' "sovereignty" and "independence." But I assume that most frequently the factor that was the stumbling block was the difference of opinions concerning the economic reforms that each republic was carrying out in its own way.

Those economic maladjustments dictated their conditions. And they led to the failure of all of the good intentions of the unifying processes. After a few bumps, we got the idea of, as I would express it, integrating at various speeds. The first fruit of this process was the agreement between Russia and Belarus concerning the customs union, and then the annexation of Kazakhstan to that agreement.

People ask why Russia's first choice went to Belarus. Some saw in that some kind of dirty trick, and others saw practically a Kremlin plot. However, the reason was simple: for two years Russia and Belarus had already been doing work on trade integration. That work had been begun within the confines of negotiations to unify the monetary systems of both countries. Although that unification did not occur, the work was not wasted. We managed to do a lot in the area of foreign trade. For example, we have completely abolished the limitations in reciprocal trade. Thanks to this cooperation, in both countries the normative base and the systems for regulating foreign-economic activity have been brought substantially closer together.

Incidentally, we have made no secret of the creation of the customs union. On the contrary, we invited practically all the CIS countries to participate in it. Some, like Uzbekistan, at one time took a cool attitude to this. Others, including Ukraine, proposed, instead of forming the customs union, the carrying out of work to improve free trade within the CIS. That, in our opinion, does not infringe upon the independence of their states and at the same time makes it possible to come to an understanding and resolve all the problems in a friendly way, and perhaps even by way of an exception. There probably is a certain kind of logic in these arguments. So far, the free-trade conditions enable the CIS countries actually to resolve many problems. But, as a rule, it does not provide for equivalent exchange. And not infrequently Russia's interests have suffered from that.

The customs union, however, establishes closer relations among the countries. It removes all internal obstacles for the movement of commodities and establishes rules of the game that are identical for everyone, They include the complete abolition of customs duties, taxes, and fees, as well as any quantitative limitations. But in relations with third countries there must be established, for all the participants in the customs union, an identical system, common customs tariffs, and measures for nontariff regulation of foreign trade.

The prices of all types of commodities will be determined by supply and demand in all three countries. Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have already signed agreements concerning the reciprocal conversion of national currencies. Banks will carry out the official quoting of the currencies of the three countries and will be required to accept all three currencies as legal tender. The rate of exchange will be established on the basis of the results of stock-market auctions. There exists an understanding concerning the providing of reciprocal access of authorized banks to the currency markets of all three countries.

Simultaneously with the creation of a common space, there also arises a common military-strategic space. As early as the first stage, all three countries have refused to require payment for the presence on their territory of troops from another state. Favorable conditions are also being created for creating industrial-finance groups, and for developing investment and credit-and-finance activity.

And something that is no less important for the present time: all three states pledge to observe the rights and freedoms of the individual, and pledge that they will not allow any forms of discrimination on the basis

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of nationality or other consideration. There will be a definition of the legal status of the citizens of one state who are residing on the territory of another state, and steps have been taken to guarantee the freedom of their movement, to introduce a simplified mechanism for obtaining citizenship in any of the three states, and this will guarantee every citizen's right to live, get a job, and purchase real estate within the confines of those states.

In principle, the agreement on the customs union opens up the path to the restoration of the common economic space that was destroyed with the collapse of the Union. But that path has definitely not been strewn with flowers. Even the current work of unifying the foreign-trade, customs, currency-finance, price, tax, and other economic legislation requires tremendous efforts and good will and the search for compromises. Despite the three months of operation of joint groups to unify the customs tariffs of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, we have not yet coordinated, for example, the rates for more than 50 items, or 100 types of commodities.

Another problem that may prove to be an acute one is the mechanism for making decisions in the customs union. There is no single approach. The "each country has one vote" version would scarcely seem to be a just one. In my opinion, the votes must be determined proportionally to the country's economic potential or, at least, to the percentage of trade with third countries. These are not imperialistic intentions. It is only in this way that Russia or another country will be able adequately to represent and defend the interests of its subjects that are engaging in economic activity and its commodity producers.

After the creation of the "triple union," the CIS countries began to show more active interest in it. Certain countries decided to join it. In principle it is open to all countries, including the East European countries. Other than common customs principles, the most important requirement is the existence of a standardized mechanism for regulating the economy, which mechanism is based on the market principles of management and unified legislation. The rules of the game that were established in the "triple union" are rather strict. As has been demonstrated by practical life, it is no easy matter to fulfill them. They require a large amount of work and even, in certain respects, the rejection of national sovereignty. But, as has been shown convincingly by the experience in Europe and America, the game, as the expression goes, is worth the candle.

*Documents Regulating Development of CIS Production Cooperation

*Text of Statute on Cooperation

954E0932A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 14

[Text of "Statute on the Procedure for Provision of Goods (Work, Services) Within the Scope of Production Cooperation and Specialization of Production Between Enterprises and Sectors of the Russian Federation and Other Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States," date and place unknown]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The present statute is ratified on the basis of the Russian Federation Government decree of 24 October 1994, No 1190, "On Measures for Ensuring Fulfillment of the Agreement on General Conditions and Mechanism for Support of the Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States and the Protocol on the Mechanism of Realization of This Agreement," which assigns to Minsotrudnichestvo [Ministry on Economic Cooperation with Governments-Members of the Commonwealth] of Russia, Minekonomika [Ministry of Economics] of Russia, the State Customs Committee of Russia, the MFER [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia and other federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of subjects of the Russian Federation, the task of ensuring fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Russian side under the Agreement on General Conditions and Mechanism for Support of Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States, signed in Ashkhabad on 23 December 1993 (henceforth referred to as the Agreement), and the Protocol on the Mechanism for Realization of the Agreement, signed in Moscow on 15 April 1994 (henceforth referred to as the Protocol). (The Agreement and Protocol are appended, Appendix No 1).

2. The statute defines the procedure for delivery of goods and provision of services within the scope of production cooperation and specialization of production of enterprises and sectors, including associations, joint enterprises, financial-industrial groups and organizations of the Russian Federation, with enterprises, sectors and analogous structures of other Commonwealth member-states in accordance with the Agreement and the Protocol.

3. In accordance with the Agreement and the Protocol, the present Statute is applied in relations between those states which have adopted the unified normative documents on questions of the order and customs

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certification of goods delivered under cooperation, and have implemented them.

4. Delivery of goods within the scope of production cooperation and specialization of production is understood to be the delivery of raw goods, materials, assemblies, parts, spare parts, intermediate products, semi-finished products, components and other goods of sectorial and intersectorial significance necessary for technologically interrelated types of production and joint manufacture of finished products.

Provision of services is understood to be design and repair work, technical servicing and technological operations.

Deliveries within the scope of customs regulations on goods for processing are understood to be the deliveries of goods in accordance with the conditions established by the customs legislation of the countries participating in the Agreement.

5. The effect of the Statute extends to Russian enterprises, associations, joint enterprises, financial-industrial groups and organizations, regardless of their form of ownership, which conclude with the enterprises and analogous structures of other Commonwealth member states contracts (agreements) on the basis of international sectorial and intersectorial agreements on production cooperation and specialization of production based on conditions of the Agreement (henceforth referred to as agreements). An exemplary agreement is appended. Appendix No 2).

6. The delivery of special complement goods, materials, equipment and technologies intended for production of arms and military equipment, as well as other goods subject to non-tariff measures of regulation, for purposes of maintaining the national interests and the international obligations of the Russian Federation is performed in accordance with the effective legislation of the Russian Federation.

7. Responsibility for concluding and implementing agreements by the Russian side is placed upon the federal organs of executive power. (Russian Federation Government decree of 24 October 1994, No 1190, point 2).

The said agreements are concluded at the following types of enterprises:

—Atomic industry and nuclear power production—Minatom [Ministry of Atomic Energy] of Russia;

—Communications—Minsvyazi [Ministry of Communications] of Russia;

—Food industry—Minselkhozprod [Ministry of Agricultural Products] of Russia

—Building industry—Minstroy [Ministry of Construction] of Russia;

—Fuel-energy complex—Mintopenergo [Ministry of Fuel and Energy] of Russia;

—Transport—Mintrans [Ministry of Transportation] of Russia, MPS [Ministry of Railways] of Russia;

—Defense complex—Goskomoboronprom [RF State Committee on the Defense Industry] of Russia (on civilian production);

—Light, timber, wood-processing and textile industry—Goskomprom [State Committee on Industrial Policy] of Russia;

—Machine building complex—Roskommash [RF Committee on Machine Building];

—Metallurgical complex—Roskommetallurgiya [RF Committee on Metallurgy];

—Trade—Roskomtorg [RF Committee on Trade];

—Chemical and petrochemical industry—Roskomkhimnefteprom [RF Committee on the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry].

Enterprises, organizations and associations which are not in the sphere of administration of the indicated federal organs of executive power must forward proposals associated with the appropriate profile of production listed above to the federal organs of executive power for inclusion in the agreements.

In this case, it is understood that registration of the agreements in accordance with the effective practice is performed by the said federal organ of executive power.

8. The agreements include lists of enterprises, their associations and organizations which retain specialization of production and participate in cooperation on production of goods and provision of services, as well as their products lists and specified volumes of cooperative deliveries of the most important types of products or services. These questions are worked out ahead of time with the interested organs of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

In case of technological necessity, the lists of cooperative products may include products of other sectors. In this case, responsibility for the justification of their inclusion in the list is borne by the federal organ of executive power signing the agreement.

The lists of types of products and strategically important raw materials on which quotas are set in accordance with international obligations, including raw materials supplied by a producer for the purpose of processing, as

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well as products which are excluded from the regimen of free trade in accordance with agreements in effect between Russia and another Commonwealth member state, which are included in the agreement as mentioned in point 5 of the present Statute, are first submitted to Minekonomika of Russia and the MFER of Russia by the federal organs of executive power specified in point 7 of the present Statute.

9. The federal organs of executive power listed in point 7 of the present Statute forward copies of the concluded agreements to Minsotrudnichestvo of Russia, Minekonomika of Russia, MFER of Russia and the GTK [State Customs Committee] of Russia.

10. Minsotrudnichestvo of Russia and Minekonomika of Russia, with involvement of interested federal organs of executive power, do the following:

Perform an analysis of these agreements;

Prepare and present to the Russian Federation Government proposals on improving the mechanism of support and development of production cooperation of enterprises and sectors of the Russian Federation with the enterprises and sectors of other Commonwealth member-states;

In conjunction with the states participating in the Agreement, perform work on unification of normative documents aimed at the support and development of specialization and cooperation of the enterprises and sectors of these states.

11. Delivery from Russia of products on which quotas have been set in accordance with international obligations, as well as strategically vital raw material goods, is performed in accordance with the procedure defined by the effective legislation of the Russian Federation.

12. Deliveries of cooperative products may be included in inter-governmental agreements on trade-economic cooperation of Russia with other CIS member-states.

13. The procedure for transport across the Russian Federation customs boundary of goods supplied in accordance with the Agreement and the Protocol is approved by the Russian Federation State Customs Committee (GTK of Russia).

The GKT of Russia provides for accounting of deliveries of these goods.

14. The realization of the agreements is performed by means of concluding contracts (agreements) on their basis between enterprises, associations and organizations of the Russian Federation and enterprises and analogous structures of other Commonwealth member-states.

15. Accounting and payments between enterprises for the goods and services supplied under contracts (agreements) concluded on the basis of the Agreement are performed through the RF [Russian Federation] Central Bank or its duly authorized RF commercial banks.

16. In accordance with the Agreement, goods delivered to the Russian Federation within the scope of production cooperation and specialization of production are not subject to re-export to third countries, including by foreign individuals and legal entities or by international organizations, without written consent of the authorized agency of the state from whose territory these products are delivered.

If there are grounds to believe that the goods declared for export are goods which were previously brought in from another Commonwealth member state within the scope of this Agreement, the origin of such goods is verified in accordance with the established procedure.

17. Enterprises within the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia may, on a contractual basis, provide aid to interested enterprises and organizations in conducting marketing surveys, training and re-training of cadres, providing leasing services, and organizing exhibits and advertising campaigns directed at development of the production cooperation of the enterprises.

*Agreement on Support for Cooperation Mechanism

954E0932B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 14

[Text of "Agreement on General Conditions and Mechanism for Support of Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States," executed in city of Ashkabad, date unknown]

[FBIS Translated Text] The governments of the states participating in the present Agreement, henceforth referred to as the Parties,

In fulfillment of the decisions of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth, adopted on 14 May and 24 September 1993 in Moscow, as well as for the purpose of achieving the goals and principles of the Economic Union;

Considering the technological interrelations which have been formed between the scientific-technical and production potentials of the states;

Recognizing the decisive role of direct production interaction of economic subjects of the Commonwealth

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member-states in creating a common economic space on the basis of market relations;

Striving to ensure favorable conditions for maintenance and mutually beneficial development of production cooperation and direct ties between enterprises and sectors within the framework of the Commonwealth,

Have agreed to the following:

Article 1.

The parties shall take effective measures to ensure state support for the implementation and development of cooperation between enterprises of all forms of ownership, sectorial and intersectorial complexes on the basis of their direct production relations, as well as within the framework of financial-industrial groups and trans-national production associations and joint enterprises.

Article 2.

The parties shall implement a coordinated policy in the sphere of: Development of international specialization and cooperation of production and conditions of their implementation; Determination of priorities in sectors of industry; Assistance in development and realization of joint projects and programs; Implementation of multilateral coordination of production, including the sphere of conversion of the defense sectors.

Article 3.

The parties have agreed that:

The deliveries of goods by cooperation is understood to be the deliveries of raw goods, materials, assemblies, parts, spare parts, intermediate products, semi-finished products, complement and other goods of sectorial and intersectorial significance which are technologically interrelated and necessary for joint manufacture of the end product;

Provision of services is understood to be the performance of design and repair work, technical servicing and technological operations;

Deliveries within the scope of customs regulations on goods for processing are understood to be deliveries of goods in accordance with the conditions set forth by the customs legislation of the Parties, unless otherwise specified in the present Agreement.

Article 4.

The Parties recognize that the primary segments in production cooperation and direct ties are the agreements (contracts) which are concluded by the economic subjects on the basis of the appropriate intergovernmental, sectorial and interdepartmental agreements, and up until the creation of a customs union serve as the principle for the customs organs in passage of goods delivered by cooperation across the border. Customs certification of goods is performed in accordance with the present Agreement and in accordance with the procedure specified by the customs legislation of the Parties.

Article 5.

The parties promise not to impose import and export duties, taxes, excise taxes and quantitative limitations in regard to goods delivered by cooperation within the scope of customs regimens of processing.

The Parties have agreed that their competent organizations shall develop a specific order of effectiveness of the present article.

Article 6.

The procedure for delivery of special complement goods intended for production of arms and military equipment, as well as other specific goods subject to non-tariff means of regulation for purposes of adhering to the established international guarantees, is defined by the individual intergovernmental agreements.

Article 7.

The Parties shall not hinder the opening of accounts in their banks in accordance with the procedure and in the times specified by their national legislation. The parties shall assign the appropriate organizations the task of performing work on bringing closer together the legislation and the practical economic management in this sphere.

The Parties have agreed to refrain from demands of payment for the supplied goods (work, services) in freely convertible currency.

Article 8.

The Parties proceed from the fact that the enterprises of the Parties concluding the present Agreement sell the products produced by them (work, services) at prices determined by them by mutual agreement.

The parties have agreed to ensure the creation of conditions necessary for the unhindered performance of accounting for deliveries of products and services specified in Article 3 of the present Agreement.

The procedure of opening and maintaining mutual accounts is established in accordance with the agreement between the central (national) banks of the Parties.

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Article 9.

In necessary cases, the Parties shall coordinate conditions of granting credits and investments stimulating the development of cooperation in scientific-intensive types of production and export-oriented sectors, as well as the output of import-replacing products.

Article 10.

The Parties have agreed that the raw goods, materials and complement goods supplied within the scope of the present Agreement are not subject to re-export to third countries, including to foreign individuals, legal entities or international organizations, without the written consent of the authorized agency of the supplier state.

Article 11.

The Parties have stipulated, for purposes of development of integrational processes in the production sphere, that they shall perform consistent work on coordination and rapprochement of the standards of national legislation in relation to economic subjects and in regard to regulation of cooperative ties of enterprises and sectors.

Article 12.

The Parties shall organize the joint development of the following problems:

Development of model treaties and agreements on long-term production cooperation;

Performance of marketing and leasing studies and organization of exhibits; Provision of advertising services;

Development of current informational communications between the Commonwealth member-states and other interested states, which would provide assistance in seeking out partners, preparation, conclusion and fulfillment of agreements (contracts);

Implementation of joint measures for training specialists.

Article 13.

The present Agreement is subject to ratification by the Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedure, and becomes effective after submission of the third ratification certificate to the depository agent.

Ratification certificates are submitted to the depository agent of the present Agreement—the Government of the Republic of Belarus. The depository agent notifies all the agreeing parties and states which have joined them regarding each document which has been submitted for safekeeping.

The present Agreement is open for membership to any Commonwealth of Independent States member-state, as well as to third parties who recognize its principles, upon consent of the participants in the Agreement.

Article 14.

The present Agreement is concluded for an unlimited period of time. The Agreement may be denounced by the Parties. The denunciation goes into effect for the Party making the appropriate announcement upon expiration of 6 months from the moment of receipt of the notification sent by it to the remaining Parties. **Executed in the city of Ashkhabad in one original copy, in the Russian language. The original copy is kept at the Government Archives of the Republic of Belarus, which shall forward a certified copy of it to the states which have signed the present Agreement.**

*Protocol on Realizing Cooperation Agreement

954E0932C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 14

[Text of "Protocol on the Mechanism of Realization of the Agreement on General Conditions and the Mechanism of Support of the Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States," executed in Moscow, date unknown]

[FBIS Translated Text] For purposes of developing an effective mechanism for realization of the Agreement on General Conditions and Mechanism of Support of the Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States, signed on 23 December 1993 in the city of Ashkhabad, the governments of the Commonwealth member-states (henceforth referred to as the Parties) have agreed on implementation of the following measures:

Article 1.

Since specialization of production is an important condition for preservation and development of formulated and newly created technological and cooperative interrelations between the enterprises and organizations of the Commonwealth states, the Parties have deemed it expedient to promote the development of mutually beneficial specialization of production on the basis of long-term sectorial and intersectorial agreements, an inalienable part of which will be the lists of enterprises retaining specialization for the term of effectiveness of the Agreement and the lists of the most important types of products produced by them, coordinated between the state and non-state structures.

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Article 2.

For development of Articles 4 and 12 of the Agreement of 23 December 1993, the Parties approve the text of the Exemplary Agreement on Production Cooperation between the appropriate state organs of sectorial administration or associations of enterprises of all forms of ownership (Appendix 1).

Intersectorial and sectorial agreements specified in Articles 1 and 2 of the present Protocol must include lists of enterprises performing deliveries, as well as lists (by products list and in the necessary volumes) of individual types of raw goods and materials, as well as vital assemblies, parts, spare parts, intermediate products, semifinished products, complement and other goods of sectorial and intersectorial significance necessary for joint manufacture of the finished product, supplied by enterprises and organizations of the Parties for provision of stable operation of technologically related types of production, as well as lists of provided services.

Deliveries of goods on which quotas have been set in the states participating in the Agreement of 23 December, and delivered under cooperation, are performed in accordance with the order adopted in each of the states, and with consideration for the concluded intergovernmental agreements on trade-economic cooperation.

States participating in the Agreement of 23 December 1993 shall provide for the performance of registration of the indicated intersectorial and sectorial agreements by the authorized organs of state administration.

On the basis of the indicated agreements, the economic subjects of all forms of ownership and subordination conclude contracts (agreements) on deliveries of goods, on cooperation, and on provision of services.

Article 3.

For purposes of achieving cooperation, principles of customs control and passage of goods delivered under cooperation, provision of services and deliveries within the scope of customs regimens of processing in accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of the Agreement of 23 December 1993, the Parties have deemed it necessary to develop, taking into consideration the effective national regulations and international agreements in which they participate, unified principles on the order of delivery and customs certification of goods under production cooperation. On the basis of these principles, the customs agencies and organs of foreign economic relations of the Parties shall implement control over deliveries of the indicated types of products and services.

Article 4.

The parties shall create work groups comprised of competent specialists for preparing drafts of model agreements and normative documents, as specified in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Protocol.

The Parties have agreed to implement unification of these documents and their simultaneous implementation, keeping in mind the fact that the Agreement of 23 December 1993 and the present Protocol are applied in relations between those states which have adopted the unified normative documents on questions of the procedure for delivery and customs certification of goods supplied under cooperation.

Article 5.

The Parties have agreed to implement, within a month's time, the development of unified normative documents in regard to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Protocol, with consideration of the drafts of documents submitted by the Russian side (Appendices 1, 2).

Article 6.

For purposes of timely provision of accounting and payment for goods and services supplied under agreements (contracts) of legal entities of the Parties, by the agreement and protocol concluded on the basis of the Agreement of General Conditions and Mechanism of Support of the Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States, it is deemed necessary for accounting between the legal entities to be implemented through the central (national) or commercial banks of the Parties, stemming from the fact that a Party which is the recipient of a product ensures the creation of conditions necessary for unhindered implementation of accounting.

Article 7.

The Parties have deemed it necessary to organize, through their state statistical and customs agencies, the collection and processing of unified statistical information on goods delivered under cooperation, implemented within the framework of the Agreement of 23 December 1993.

Article 8.

The parties recommend to their chambers of commerce and industry and other informational structures that they provide assistance to interested enterprises and organizations in conducting marketing surveys, providing leasing services, organizing exhibits and advertisement campaigns aimed at the development of production cooper-

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ation of the economic subjects of the Commonwealth member-states.

Article 9.

The present Protocol is an integral part of the Agreement on the General Conditions and Mechanism of Supporting the Development of Production Cooperation of Enterprises and Sectors of the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant-States, dated 23 December 1993. **Executed in the city of Moscow in one original copy, in the Russian language. The original is kept at the Government Archives of the Republic of Belarus, which will forward a certified copy to the states signing the present Protocol.**

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Political Issues

*Law on State Duma Elections Discussed

954F2259A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 27 Apr-3 May 95 p 8

[Article by Irina Velikanova under the rubric "The Fact of the Matter": "The Elections: Once Again Nothing Will Happen to the Violators"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Parliamentary intrigue around the law "On Elections of Deputies of the State Duma" has entered a new spiral.**

After the Federation Council rejected the law (the main thing that does not suit the senators, as is known, is the ratio in the future Duma of "majority" and "party" deputies), a conciliation commission was established which was supposed to draw up a compromise decision. However, the senators displayed extreme lack of discipline, not showing up at meetings of the commission—with the exception of Yuriy Boldyrev and Yelena Mizulina. As a result, no coordinated text of the law appeared last Friday.

Duma members reacted calmly to the sabotage of their colleagues: They once again voted for their law and once again sent it to the Federation Council. Thus, we can expect the establishment of yet another conciliation commission in the near future, inasmuch as the senators, as is known, are people of principle, and have not gotten accustomed to forgoing their principles. Especially since the uncompromising debate about how best to divide the mandates in the future Duma for both houses is not a bad method of relieving their dull days.

This discussion is less interesting to the voters. To tell the truth, they are generally indifferent to it. In any case, there are things in the half-adopted law that touch on the interests of the voting population to a much greater degree than the procedure for distributing mandates. In the first place—this is a question of guarantees of the legality of the electoral procedure.

Everyone remembers the scandal that broke out after the last elections when some electoral associations, in particular Yabloko and Russia's Choice, were caught red-handed in financial abuses—allegedly using foreign capital. This accusation was made not by some unofficial well-wisher, but by the Central Electoral Commission. Nevertheless, no sentence followed. The Duma quietly hushed up an incident that it found unpleasant, and Nikolay Ryabov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, explained to journalists: The election laws in effect, unfortunately, do not permit violators to be punished the way they should be. The prohibitions have been stipulated, but no sanctions for violating them have been provided. So there will be new legislation, and then—with all severity....

The newly written law "On Elections of Deputies to the State Duma" at first glance substantially restricts the candidates' financial freedom. First, the formation of election funds to finance preelection campaigns are envisioned. These funds are not without limits: The actual resources of an electoral association, for example, cannot exceed the minimum wage by more than a factor of 100,000. Juridical persons who donate their money to individual candidates and associations must stay within the bounds of 200 and 2,000 minimum wages respectively. The maximum sum of expenditures of a candidate at the expense of the resources of an election fund cannot exceed the minimum wage size by a factor of 10,000, and the expenditures of an electoral bloc or association—by a factor of 250,000.

The resources of the election funds, according to the law, should be kept in special temporary accounts in branches of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation. Donations to election funds are not permitted on the part of "foreign states, organizations and citizens, persons who do not have citizenship, and Russian juridical persons with foreign participation—if the share of foreign capital of their authorized capital exceeds 30 percent—international organizations and international social movements, organs of local self-government, state and municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations, military units, and military institutions and organizations." In addition, banks are obliged to give information on the receipt of resources for special temporary accounts of candidates and electoral associations to the appropriate electoral commission in a three-day period from the day of receipt. But they, if it is required, must inform the electoral commission about the expenditure of monetary resources in the aforementioned accounts.

So detailed a juridical-mathematical regulation arouses a respect that turns into mental anguish. Everything is taken into account, everything is envisioned! Imagine, however, an impudent person who dares to bypass these strict standards. For example, some candidate or association is caught in a shameless financial swindle. What will happen to them? Will the electoral commission not give the mandate? Will the procurator file a suit?

In such cases, as the law states, "the appropriate electoral commission has the right to submit a presentment to the court on cancellation of the decision concerning the registration of the candidate or the federal list of candidates." That is all! Let us take note: After establishing the fact of malicious violation of the law, the electoral commission is not at all obligated to rush to court, it

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only has a "right to appeal." That is, this is a matter of voluntary choice of the electoral commission chairman. If he wants to make trouble for the candidate—he will do it, if he does not—he will let him go in peace. Thus, the law gives free range to unlimited arbitrariness and bribery of electoral commissions.

The developers of the law, as could be expected, were guided by "considerations of humanity." "Automatism is not justified in such cases," said Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Duma Committee for Constitutional Legislation and Court and Legal Reform, to an OBSHCHAYA GAZETA correspondent. "The illegal use by candidates of monetary resources can be also contrived by somebody as a provocation. And it would be incorrect to make it incumbent on electoral commissions that are out of touch with the substance of a question to go to court each time."

In addition, in Isakov's opinion, the number of financial violations depends not only on the degree of severity of the law: "If the authorities do not drive people to dishonest action, and do not cheat themselves, there will be fewer violations on the part of competitors for mandates," Isakov believes. "If the authorities set an example of a cynical attitude toward legislation, what can be demanded of candidates?" True, Mr. Isakov admitted that there are probably no limits to cynicism today with respect to legislation, but again, it does not follow from this, in his opinion, that it is necessary to make the legislation tougher. But the famous jurist did not say what does follow from this.

"I think that the wording 'has the right' signifies the possibility of resolving a question by methods other than a judicial procedure," Aleksey Lyubimov, deputy of a legislative committee section, added to what was said by his patron. At the same time, Mr. Lyubimov refused to explain what he means by "other methods." Perhaps an exchange of calling cards between competitors for mandates and members of electoral commissions? Or a duel with swords?

Without any risk of erring, it is possible to say beforehand: Such questions will be resolved most frequently precisely in a "nonjudicial procedure." In other words, violations of election legislation and the impunity of violators are reliably guaranteed....by the law. This is not an accidental blunder of the developers of the draft law, and many of the current parliamentarians, obviously, are interested in the law being more lenient. The executive authority is also interested in this. The president of Russia, like his Kazakh colleague, at any appropriate moment can find that "cynical violations" were committed in the course of the elections and on this basis retire the Duma.

Such a possibility is more likely the more vacuity and ambiguity there is in election legislation. And there is enough of this. For example, the deputies rejected the amendment of Yuriy Boldyrev concerning compulsory verification of 0.1 percent of the subscription list of candidates. The question about what percent of forged election ballots are declared void also remained outside the scope of election legislation. And this was after the court in Lipetsk Oblast confirmed the legality of the election of the head of the local administration, meanwhile declaring that 40 percent (!) of the ballots were forged. If even a violation of this degree of gravity does not entail any kind of sanctions, then all discourse on the legality or illegality relative to the election procedure looks like mere verbiage.

*Commentary' Views Criminal Statistics for 1994

954F2214A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 95 p 10

["Commentary" by Vadim Bakatin: "Commentary on Criminal Statistics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have always agreed with the well known idea, which was most recently expressed by Minister V. F. Yerin, to the effect that "crime is a derivative of social, economic, and political processes occurring in society." Therefore, I was somewhat surprised by the poorly concealed joy that certain high officials expressed concerning the report of "success"—a 6-percent reduction in overall crime in 1994—and the fact that street crime had been driven "where it belongs" (?!).

Last year was a year of acceleration in the collapse of production, chaos in finances, and political prostitution that made it possible for a war to be launched on our own territory. Social tension rose, and in accordance with the law that was rightly noted by the minister, there was no objective basis for a reduction in crime, yet criminals behaved atypically. That happens. No two years are the same.

Let us not suspect that anyone might have a stake in having favorable statistics. Let us recall that crime in Russia and in the USSR increased before and after 1917 under all regimes. Granted, the statistics would "improve," by and large, before the big communist anniversaries. Now there seems to be no need or occasion for such a thing, if you don't consider the relatively unlikely presidential "reelection" of 1996.

Of course, if we had absolutely reliable crime statistics, one might give an overall assessment of the state of the economy and society the way one can read a patient's temperature chart: by observing the percentages of

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fluctuation in crime. No such statistics, however, can exist.

In any case, the data from a single year is extremely inadequate for speaking of an extremely grave social pathology: crime.

I propose to take as a base 1991, the year that the present "team" came to power, and to the extent that a five-page commentary permits, to look at what has happened over the first three years of the democrats' rule, comparing this to the last three years of the death throes of perestroyka.

In 1994 overall crime was up 21 percent from 1991. Compared with 1988, 1991 looked considerably worse. The rate of increase was 75 percent. One can argue about certain known objective and subjective circumstances, but a fact remains a fact. The highest rates of increase in recorded crimes in the history of Russia occurred in the last three years of perestroyka.

Now it is time to compare the dynamics of the most dangerous, serious crimes, but that turns out to be not all that easy. In 1994 this figure was left out of the totals for some reason. There are statistics for the most serious of all serious crimes: detected murders. In 1988 10,500 people were murdered; in 1991 16,200 were murdered; and in 1994 the number was 32,200. It is impossible to comment on these tragic figures. Compare them for yourself.

Cruelty and violence have sharply increased in our society. Human life, not to mention human rights, has become worthless. No, there have not been and cannot be any statistical "successes" in the fight against crime. There can be only one success: to instill in the public mind to the greatest extent possible the certainty that punishment is inescapable for a criminal. In this regard there are positive changes for Russian militia personnel in the 1994 statistics. The rate of crimes solved rose nine points and reached 59.6 percent.

We should not rush to draw conclusions until we find out how our devastated judicial system supported this small step by the militia in the direction of unavoidable punishment.

Even the militia was by no means active in all areas. The now chronic decline in the number of detected and solved crimes in the sphere of our ruthlessly plundered economy leads one to extremely depressing thoughts. That is what happened during the time of perestroyka, when "cooperatives" preyed like parasites on state property, and that is what is continuing in our time, when plundering has been elevated to the rank of the state policy of so-called privatization, "Chubays style."

It is commonly recognized that the scale of theft has reached unprecedented proportions, yet the number of recorded crimes associated with "privatization" has been sharply declining. In 1994, according to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], there were only 1,749 crimes for all of vast Mother Russia. You may as well consider that there were none at all. Everything was legal. That is disgusting.

If one agrees with the idea expressed by Petr Romanov, deputy to the Federation Council, to the effect that economic crime is the direct consequence of the present pseudo-reforms, it becomes clear why the present pseudo-reformist government peacefully coexists or cohabits with that crime.

You will agree that if in 1994, the tax police detected 2.6 times as many crimes connected with concealing income from taxes, that is not bad but good—on the condition that the pace is maintained or increased in 1995—because 8,300 crimes is just one per 200,000 citizens of Russia.

We love to try to catch up with America. So here: in the United States that figure is 10 times as high. One of two things is true: either we have already surpassed America in terms of obeying the law, or we are still lagging behind in the art of policing.

At first glance, the social and criminological characteristics of crime are highly satisfactory. Citizens can rejoice. Minors committed 0.9 percent fewer crimes, and recidivists committed 0.8 percent fewer. Moreover, if we compare the first three "democratic" years with the last three "perestroyka" years, here too the comparison will clearly favor the present.

Recidivists constituted 23.8 percent of those caught committing crimes in 1988. In 1991 the number rose predictably to 25 percent, but in 1994 for some reason it dropped to 21.8 percent. A similar tendency was apparent with juveniles. One would so like to paint idealistic pictures of corrective-labor colonies setting people on the right path, pictures of eradicating the neglect of children and of the beneficial influence of the family and the school on present-day young people going to the bazaar. For some reason, however, one cannot believe this. Can it be that the whole point lies elsewhere? Given an absolute increase in the number of recidivists and juvenile criminals, the drop in the proportion of them is attributable to the fact that life has pushed many more adult citizens, who had previously not committed crimes, onto a path of crime. The fight for reforms, degenerating into a fight for survival, takes such distorted forms.

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Finally, a word about organized crime. It has been used to frighten people for a long time, but if one looks at statistics, in 1994 only 18,619 crimes were committed by organized groups. That is just 1.2 percent of the total number of solved crimes.

Thus, the remaining 98.8 percent of crimes were committed by unorganized citizens or groups. Any child will tell you that was not the case.

I recall that back in 1989 highly prominent criminologists were trying to persuade me, the "young" minister, that there was no need to try to invent a new enemy, that we had no organized crime in our country. Now the debates have seemingly ended, and "organized crime" has become as big a clich as "democracy," the "market," "constitutional legality," and "corruption." Behind some words lies nothing, while others literally cost the lives of many, many citizens.

Under the cover of corrupted civil servants and privatized capital, organized crime has suffused every last pore of government, the economy, and finance, and now no militia will drive it out.

In my opinion, organized crime is to one degree or another involved in 90 percent of all crimes (including unsolved and latent crimes, except for hooliganism and domestic crimes), whether it be the squandering of raw-material resources, trade in arms or vodka, motor vehicle theft, drugs, prostitution, "privatization," real estate sales, or what have you.

It is no longer possible to make our way out of these criminal "reforms" in the foreseeable future. In order to begin this long and difficult path, three things are needed, at the very minimum:

a people that has cast off apathy and fatigue,

an honest governmental authority that possess political will and energy,
God's blessing.

For starters, the most obvious thing is to finally stop trying to economize on maintaining the law-enforcement system. It has long been known that every trillion below the norm that the state fails to allocate for this purpose results in losses that are a whole order of magnitude greater.

Such "economizing" can reduce the state to total collapse and society to total paralysis.

One might, to be sure, make a genuinely economical decision: cut the militia's budget. Then, as certain militant deputies demand, issue a pistol to each of them. That is sure to put an end to crime.

P.S. This commentary, which was written on the basis of the fresh 1994 results, was not published on time for reasons beyond my control. The budget has been approved. The militia received about 50 percent of the essential minimum.

Today we have statistics on the state of crime in Russia for the first quarter of this year.

One can believe them or not, but there are no other ones. The atypical "drop" in crime ended. It started to increase (plus 4.1 percent) again. Homicides rose at an even faster rate (7 percent). If 1,749 criminal proceedings initiated for all of 1994 in the sphere of privatization was considered inactivity on the part of law-enforcement agencies, what do you call the fact that in the first quarter of this year the fight against fraud in this extremely urgent sphere once again dropped by 67.2 percent?

Concealing income and failure to pay taxes on commercial activity are the scourge of our economy. In the first three months of this year, only 914 crimes were detected in all Russia, which is a lot fewer than last year.

There is not and cannot be any improvement in the criminal sphere until the economy starts to improve, the social stratification of society and impoverishment of the masses stop, and society restores respect for the law-enforcement system.

***Two Communist Party Branches Compared**

954F2225A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 28 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by Vyacheslav Dolganov: "The Party Said? It Would Be Good To Know Which One...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The mistakes and blunders on the record of the parties of democratic orientation have been too numerous to count. They were permitted to occur during the course of the preceding parliamentary election campaign, and they multiplied and are multiplying now, when a new pre-election "round" has virtually already begun. The main thing—the disconnectedness of the democratic forces, and their inability to find a common language even in situations that are critical for Russia—has been written and talked about more than sufficiently. There exists one more, no less important, bit of strategic negligence to which the democrats stubbornly fail to pay attention.

All of them seem not to notice their competitors in the struggle for deputy positions. This-minute gains in dragging through the Duma sieve this or that resolution or draft law compel them at times to form into blocs with directly antagonistic forces. And if the tricks

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of Zhirinovskiy and his party comrades still meet with some kind of opposition, including on the pages of popular publications, the remaining parties, most of which will directly oppose the democrats at the upcoming elections for the president of Russia, to the Federal Assembly, and to the State Duma, seem not to exist for Russia's Choice, Democratic Russia, PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], or Yabloko.

An outstanding political scientist of our time, Joseph Napolitan, recommends in the meantime: "Propagandizing one's own positive intention is a very important matter. However, it is no less important to constantly study the programs of one's competitors, and to react strategically to any changes in them. What does that bring during an election campaign? You easily discover in your rival, first of all, frankly weak, demagogic areas and unfulfillable promises; second, you find unfulfilled points from their previous programs. All this is a boon to real politicians, who know how to make use of the slightest bit of negligence on the other side."

Napolitan is a lobby-type political strategist. He has formed and headed teams that have contributed to the ascension to power of two American presidents, several U.S. vice presidents, and up to 10 heads of other states. Alas, his many books up to recent times have not been translated here at all, and one of the most famous, "One Hundred Pieces of Advice on the Organization of an Election Campaign," was published in an extremely insufficient edition by a little-known private company.

In third countries, Napolitan has also had occasion to come out against communists, who have at times formed into blocs with parties of the type of our Agrarian Party and the Women of Russia. His competitors were invariably beaten. However, we recall this circumstance not at all in order punctually to repeat advice applied to a specific country and specific circumstances. No—it is simply that the democrats should take into account the fact that their main rival at the elections this time will be the creators of the "bright future-past." They have gotten down to work long and actively. And here they make use of numerous opportunities, first of all the press, and also the corps of directors, which in many regions is quite unambiguously inclined. And at the same time they have the opportunity to order—at the expense of their by no means flourishing enterprises—million-copy runs of proclamations, pamphlets, and posters, and even to prepare in the capital special issues of little-known newspapers with their speeches, election programs, and the requisite surrounding background.

But in their headlong push also lies the main weakness of an organization that has not accumulated in the years of its existence (especially in the conditions of Soviet party monopolism) either flexibility or sufficient ideological refinement. After all, you must agree that it is one thing to herd the complaisant "working masses" to political reports, at clubs and evening universities of Marxism-Leninism to drum ideological rubbish into the heads of those there, and quite another thing to get the votes of the electorate. Both Communist wings (the Zyuganovite and the Shenin-Solovyevite, represented by the so-called UCP-CPSU [Union of Communist Parties—CPSU]) do not greatly differ in their share of the enticement.

They have in common the reconstruction of the Union state, according to the formula, "a union of peoples, a federation of territories"—acknowledgement of the geopolitical responsibility of the future Union government for the territory on which the Soviet Union was situated. And the main thing is the unrestrained (incidentally, without any clear economic study or basis) promises "to change in a fundamental way the life of the working person, to return to him the role of master of his country and his fate, to guarantee a noticeable increase in the level of social protection." Both the one kind and the other speak out in frenzied fashion against the "colonial ideology of today's ruling regimes." And the UCP-CPSU gets so tangled up in its rantings on this issue that it imagines that the West intends to "dress us in its cast-offs, to take away our national dress (?!) and our everyday goods."

As you can understand, these trump cards are beaten fairly easily. With all of our present-day burdens, misfortunes, and insufficiencies, any person whose memory has not atrophied will recall how he lived at all the "stages of the big road." How a ruble never stretched until payday and how much effort was exhausted in getting the most primitive food, clothing, and furniture products and much else that is necessary for a life distinguishable hardly at all from the existence of Western unemployed persons and garbage collectors. The exception at all times was, perhaps, Moscow, the "showcase of socialism."

THEY imagine that you and I have quickly and easily forgotten the decades of shootings, concentration camps, and psychiatric wards, and that sticky, nauseating fear that nested in every soul, including those of the executioners themselves. The "new" communists most often distance themselves from the crimes of their predecessors, committed not only against their people but also against humanity as a whole. Although the ideologist of the UCP-CPSU, Oleg Shenin, warns, "....Now and then, far-from-scientific ideas are also beginning to be advanced, for instance, about 'Russia's having exhausted the limit for revolution.'" You are not completely clear as to what the former GKChP [State Committee for the

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State of Emergency] man is hinting at? He clarifies it further: "What are the efforts worth to give proof of class peace between the more and more insolent comprador bourgeoisie and the working class, which is being thrown out in the street?" In general, "Call Rus to take up the axe," and to the devil with any public accords.

Here, I will note, the paths of the militant Leninists begin to diverge. In any case, so it could appear if you do not follow too attentively their tempestuous activity, their numberless interviews and meetings with those same "working masses" in the localities.

Yes, Zyuganov is less unbridled, and he resolutely pulls up his party comrades when they get carried too far to the left, into the rhetoric of the times of the Cheka and war communism. The social-democratic respectability that the democratic publications attribute to him is really there. But only in the capacity, let us say, of a fashionable civilian raincoat, under which there is that same service jacket, beloved of the leaders, with riding breeches and soft boxcalf boots. He smiles when the faction that he manipulates with the agility of the great magician Akopyan mildly reproves a leader for "individual manifestations of revisionism and a retreat from the general line of Leninism."

This party likes to be outwardly Europeanized. The leaders have tasted of the delights of the comfortable deputy life, voyages to foreign countries, and their reception as parliamentarians, and not as the bearers of world revolution. Most of its functionaries do not shun business, and at the very least stand up for the interests of certain commercial structures, introducing amendments to any draft that seem muddle-headed to the uninitiated, and that tangle up the legislation to an absurd degree. Their line is patriotism, even a flirting with monarchy. Quite recently, Gennadiy Zyuganov answered a question of Nikolay Leontiev, press secretary of the Assembly of the Nobility and a member of the editorial board of the newspaper DVORYANSKIY VESTNIK ["Nobility Herald"], on his attitude toward the monarchistic mood in society in this way:

"Russia has known two kinds of government during all of its history—the monarchist and the council-Soviet (!). Both of them have demonstrated certain advantages at corresponding stages. It will be necessary to see how events will develop in the future."

Excuse me?... Priests have appeared at the rallies and gatherings of the eternal atheists, and red flags successfully wave side by side with the standards of the imperial court. But the very most important thing is that Zyuganov's warriors acknowledge all forms of ownership, including the private.

The UCP-CPSU, preparing for its 30th Congress, is more dogmatically inclined. But that is also a game. Why? We will think about this a little further on. These people profess an extremely orthodox ideology, Marxism-Leninism—their only light in the window.

The orthodox cannot stand to hear the phrase "private property"; it brings on fits of ideological frenzy and political choler. To their last breath and to their last drop of blood, they call (again, not themselves, but gullible, despairing simpletons) to relate everything to positions of class struggle and not to cease this struggle for an instant. Anything else that is fresh, distinct from the 75-year-old cud, they do not have. Except maybe to remember the program thesis on "all possible support for high-technology production." That is it. Period.

Proceeding from minor outward differences, individual ideologues of democracy have hastened to pronounce sentence on their future competitors; they say, they are torn up with discord, with fundamental differences in their approaches to reality and to the country's prospects for development. And therefore they supposedly cannot come forward as a single monolith. Ah, we are in a hurry.... Think about it, what common goal is set by the one and the other, and also the more or less orthodox and radical groups of the Nina Andreyeva type, which join in their refrain? "AFTER THE OPPOSITION WINS POWER, THE COUNTRY WILL BE FACED WITH THE TASK OF BUILDING A NEW SOCIETY." There you go....

And all their differences are no more than fishing poles in the hands of one and the same fisherman. On one—spoon bait for the toothy pikes, ready to bite everyone on the left and on the right; on others, hooks of various sizes for spineless carp and wise gudgeon. Communists A will play at monarchy, faith, and entrepreneurship. Communists B will form into columns those who have not sated themselves on world campaigns for "happiness for all" with a revolver at the other guy's temple and with Kim's growing young fry from the piranha species. And where and at whom to lead both the one and the other, they will figure out, of that you may have no doubt.

To fail to notice this would be stupidity. To ignore and not to expose it, every day and every hour, publicly, from the Duma or any other rostrum, is suicide. About which, incidentally, the above-mentioned Joseph Napolitan warns in his hundred pieces of advice: "To see and understand the plans of one's competitor and to remain silent about them is to deliberately lose, if not more."

For us, this "if not more" has an ominous sense.

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Pollution Deemed National Security Threat

95WN0155A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 28 Apr-4 May 95 p 12

[Article by Vyacheslav Nedogonov, Moscow News: "Dying Land Threatens National Security"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Throughout the Soviet era vast plots of land became worthless. They were poisoned by chemical discharges from large industrial enterprises or simply by the excessive application of fertilizer.

Now that the USSR has collapsed, a considerable part of most fertile soils have passed to neighboring republics: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. A part of what has remained in Russia is referred to as "an anthropogenic desert" by soil scientists.

Carrot and Heavy Metal Salad

According to the latest information of the Dokuchayev Institute of Soil Science (Moscow), poisoned lands constitute approximately 4 percent of Russia's territory.

The process of soil poisoning substantially differs from air and water pollution. In fact, water and air may be purified. Filters can be installed, impurities will be separated and we can breathe and drink without fear. It is very difficult, almost impossible, to fully render polluted land harmless.

What we call soil (humus, in old times) is a most complicated biochemical formation, and it is difficult to imagine anything equal to it. The mellow dark substance under our feet consists by 10 percent of the organic remnants of plants and live creatures. Nature requires hundreds of years to form only 40 centimeters, in which something living could grow (and in our middle latitudes the fertile layer is only 10 centimeters).

However, only 70 years of Soviet power were enough to destroy a considerable part of valuable lands.

Throughout these years, the chimneys of industrial giants belched out smoke and so-called heavy metals: lead, copper, cadmium and arsenic.

Nature played a wicked trick on man. It took care to use the first chance to pump out the impurities that penetrated the soil. The roots of various plants play the role of a pump. The ions of heavy metals are quickly absorbed by potatoes, beet-roots, carrots...

"In some Russian regions we have described the lands as anthropogenic deserts," says Valentin Bolshakov, D. Sc. (Agriculture), head of the laboratory of the Soil Institute.

Over the past 15 years scientists have been using satellites to observe the growth process of anthropogenic deserts. It turned out that contaminated territories are seen particularly well in winter from the earth's orbit: there the snow is darker than usual. Orbital stations revealed that dead zones are expanding around 540 large cities of the former USSR.

Meanwhile, in their ignorance, people are trying to sow and even reap harvests to this day.

Dead Land 'Shines' but Does Not Warm

As surprising as it is, the problem of dead land was first mentioned among Soviet scientists only in the 1970s. Now it is difficult to recall how all of this started. It is believed that the first analyses were conducted in 1974-75 while studying the radioactive pollution of soil in the area of South Urals, which was a consequence of the so-called Kyshtym tragedy: the explosion of radioactive waste in the closed city of Chelyabinsk-40 in 1957. This was precisely when soil scientists began drawing attention to the fact that, along with radioactive pollution, particles of heavy metals were contaminating the soil. Moreover, their number is growing from year to year.

Since that time and until recently, the issue of soil destruction was regularly raised, discussed and forgotten at all the conferences of the USSR government. The last time it was recalled was when, on the instruction of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Institute of Soil Science was organizing the chapters of the famous Food program. One of its authors, Ivan Karmanov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, personally reported to the highest level about the impending disaster. However, soon after that Gorbachev resigned from his post and the program (which, according to many of its authors, contained many useful items) was forgotten.

The problem of dead lands has once again resurfaced, now that Russia has lands that are neither rich nor very fertile at its disposal. The Krasnodar Territory, where practically everything has already been ploughed up, is perhaps the only one that meets all the demands.

The other regions are either irretrievably poisoned by chemical discharges, or suffer from insufficient moisture, extreme cold, or the fact that the soil is to sour or eroded; blown away by the winds. The vast areas of Siberia allow the successful cultivation of only grass for cattle or lettuce.

According to Karmanov's calculations, over the past 25 years:

— the area of eroded soils in Russia has increased by 50 percent;

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— swamplands have expanded by 60 percent;

— salinity has increased by three times.

Every year Russian soil loses 1.5 percent of its fertility, and if this process is not stopped immediately, by the beginning of the new century the grains sown in Russian soil will no longer germinate.

The recent session of the Security Council under the president of Russia was devoted to the impending trouble. Eyewitnesses say that the session was conducted amid heated discussions. Finally, the scientists' speeches were heeded at the highest level. The situation surrounding this issue was made completely clear: the land is dying. However, those who were present talked, and then left.

It looks as though the 21st century will not be very productive for us.

Media Issues

*Duma Budget Committee Chairman Zadornov on Media Subsidies

954F2258A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 27 Apr-3 May 95 p 12

[Interview with Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the State Duma Committee on the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances, conducted by Dmitriy Andreyev, under the rubric "Friendly Get-Together" : "There Will Be No Subsidies, We Are Expecting Privileges"; date and place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The federal budget for this year left an absolute majority of Russian press publications without state subsidies. And although the RF Committee on the Press requested 144 billion rubles [R] in support for the press, ultimately the sum was reduced to R89 billion, and it was designated for an extremely narrow group of publications. The OG [OBSHCHAYA GAZETA] questions were asked of the chairman of the State Duma Committee on the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances, Mikhail Zadornov.**

[Andreyev] It seems that the deputy corps and you personally as chairman of the budget committee have put the Russian mass information media on the verge of disaster.

[Zadornov] Before reproaching us, it would be better for journalists to get to the heart of the matter. The press committee's request was examined in accordance with the established procedure by the State Duma Committee on Information Policy and Communications, which in fact suggested making changes and abolishing the practice of state subsidies. The head of the committee, Mikhail Poltoranin, suggested "tossing" slightly more than R60 billion to the communications workers, proceeding from the idea that delivery expenditures make up the lion's share of expenditures of press publications. However, later the Committee on Information Policy itself decided that R60 billion is a meager sum compared to the real costs of communications enterprises and would not affect the delivery situation at all. As a result, it was decided to use the capital to finance television and radio companies, in particular "Voice of Russia." Thus, press publications did in fact get only R89 billion.

[Andreyev] How is it distributed?

[Zadornov] The principles of distribution seemed questionable to me and continue to be so. Let us take ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA [RG]. The initial proposals of the Committee on Information Policy and Communications suggested allocating R61 billion to it! And the basis for this was that this publication has been entrusted with the functions of publishing official reports and laws. But last year, when RG performed those same functions, it was allocated only about R23 billion. What was the jump for? And where are the calculations which confirm the need to allocate precisely that sum rather than some other? There are no explanations. However, RG is only in part the state's press publication. Yes, its founder was the government of the Russian Federation, but its legal status is a closed joint stock company where by no means do all the shares of stock belong to the state. Consequently, the deputies behaved correctly by cutting the request almost in half—to R35.3 billion—and assigning this sum for all press publications whose founders are federal organs of power. Roskompechat [RF Committee on the Press] should handle the specific directions of distribution of this and other sums of state subsidies to the press.

[Andreyev] Incidentally, this State Duma decision gave ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA itself occasion to note that Roskompechat and its chairman, Sergey Gryzunov, are celebrating a "minor victory over the newspaper which broke away from them."

[Zadornov] In my opinion, this is an echo of the struggle for control over the press which is being waged between Mr. Gryzunov and Mr. Poltoranin. I must confess that RG is in part right. It is no secret to anyone that distribution of subsidies at Roskompechat is unmonitored, under the table. This puts some publications in a privileged position compared with others. As far as I know, the journalists themselves do not accept this situation, and deputies have also declared it intolerable. This is our position: either subsidies should be distributed in conditions of complete openness, or the specific sums

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of capital which are supposed to be allocated to each press publication should be presented to the State Duma in advance and then ratified by law. Incidentally, that is exactly what the television and radio companies did; they sent the Duma a thorough and extremely detailed breakdown of all the essential expenditures. We ratified it, since not only the central but also the regional and oblast television and radio companies received their "piece of the budget pie," and now the Ministry of Finance will allocate the set amounts of capital independent of the will of certain bosses.

The director of Roskompechat is in a strange position, to put it mildly. During the 4 months the draft budget was being examined in the Duma, the leaders of various departments within its walls laid out their positions and tried to persuade and prove the need for certain expenditures. Mr. Gryzunov did not appear once and, moreover, not one appeal or letter came from him. Some people will probably say that like the rest he did not want to go hat in hand. Fine, if that is the case. But no, Mr. Gryzunov simply prefers to deal with deputies exclusively through the mass information media and to organize noisy political campaigns. I do not understand why he has to blame his own lack of action on someone else's intrigues.

[Andreyev] But even so, the distribution of subsidies was left to Mr. Gryzunov?

[Zadornov] The deputies were fairly strict in assigning state subsidies by groups of publications, and that substantially reduced Roskompechat's opportunity to freely manipulate the capital. The Duma was simply unable to do more in this situation.

[Andreyev] So should we begin building a national fund for development of the mass information media, as Mikhail Poltoranin suggested?

[Zadornov] And instead of these bureaucrats, others would begin distributing the capital—that is all that is. In my opinion, the only way to change the situation is to abandon subsidies altogether, with the exception of a narrow group of publications, for the blind and such, for example.

[Andreyev] But certainly the press will not survive without subsidies.

[Zadornov] In my opinion that is a distorted idea. I am not a specialist in the field of the mass information media, but still I know several press publications which have managed to survive even in today's complex conditions without financial support from the state or powerful sponsors. Although, of course, I understand that we certainly must not change the financial situation of publications abruptly—they must have 6 months or a year to adapt to "nonsubsidized life" and arrange alternative financing schemes. Perhaps we should fall back on a system of tax or other temporary forbearance which would put all publications under equal conditions during this transition period.

[Andreyev] You are speaking of forbearance, but in an interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Mikhail Poltoranin commented on the law on state support of the mass information media adopted by the Duma and said that your "Yabloko" faction blocked the Poltoranin committee proposals to set up privileges for the mass information media. And he mentioned you personally: he said, Mikhail Zadornov is against individual privileges for journalists or anyone else.

[Zadornov] I am in fact against the practice of offering individual privileges. And I am not the only one, many other deputies are too. There is no need for special explanations here: granting privileges on an individual basis is the same old bureaucratic arbitrariness which does no good. So we should be talking not of privileges and not of a regime of state support of certain sectors, but of developing a unified state approach to such key questions as, for example, taxation. A unified tax code which specifically defines who has a right to privileges and when, under what conditions, and on what grounds is the universal instrument which we will apply to all spheres of economic and social life. Our committee and the government are in fact working very hard on creating such a code. Experts, and representatives of various state departments and private structures, and deputies from various factions and committees of the State Duma are participating in this work. We will try to complete it if not by the summer then by the fall.

Such a tax code, like any intelligent law made up with consideration of contemporary requirements, makes our life more civilized.

*Draft Edict on Gosinform Discussed

954F2258B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 27 Apr-3 May 95 p 12

[Article by Anna Politovskaya under the rubric "What Is To Be Done?": "The Gryzunov Show Continues: Soon It Will Be Called 'Gosinform'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the fourth congress of the RF Journalists Union, disputes on whether it should be convened or not still continue. Meanwhile, the authorities, it seems, have themselves decided to push journalists to extremely decisive actions in defense of the right to freedom of speech achieved at a price of enormous losses and tragedies.

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A very strange document ended up in the hands of the OG [OBSHCHAYA GAZETA] correspondent—an actual draft edict of the president himself. And despite the fact that we are not the only ones who are familiar with it, we consider it possible to quote the draft:

"On the Formation of the Russian Federation United Federal Agency for State Information Policy (Gosinform)

"In an effort to provide state support to the mass information media, consolidate legal protection of the mass information media and the rights of employees of television, radio broadcasting, and other mass information media, and put registration and licensing of the mass information in order, and in accordance with Article 80 of the RF Constitution, I decree the following:

"1. On the base of the RF Committee on the Press and the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service, create the RF United Federal Agency for State Information Policy (Gosinform). Make the corresponding changes in the structure of the federal organs of executive power ratified by the president's edict No 66 dated 10 January 1994, bearing in mind that Gosinform is a federal organ of executive power subordinate to the president.

"2. Charge Gosinform with realizing state policy in the sphere of the mass information media, monitoring compliance with legislation in the mass information media, including questions of technical inspection, preventing and stopping legal offenses in this sphere, and registering and licensing mass information media.

"3. Establish that the Television and Radio Broadcasting Service and the Committee on the Press are part of Gosinform with the rights of main administrations. Each of the structural subdivisions of Gosinform enumerated is headed by a director who is by post a first deputy general director of Gosinform.

"4. Establish that the managers of the regional (interregional) subdivisions of Gosinform are appointed to the post by the general director of Gosinform.

"5. Within a week, the RF State Committee on Administration of State Property must transfer the buildings with the following Moscow addresses to Gosinform's balance: 12 Kachalov Street, 5 Strastnoy Boulevard, and 25 Pyatnitskaya Street, with all the equipment, furniture, office equipment, and so forth in order to house the central apparat and services of Gosinform.

"6. Appoint Sergey Petrovich Gryzunov general director of Gosinform.

"7. Appoint as first deputy general directors of Gosinform: Sergey Pavlovich Luknitskiy, director of the Television and Radio Broadcasting Service, and Aleksey Borisovich Morgun, director of the Committee on the Press.

"8. Within 2 weeks, the general director of Gosinform must submit a Statute on the RF United Federal Agency for State Information Policy for ratification...."

The document is being prepared under cover of unbelievable secrecy. As if this were an operation to take Groznyy. No people in the State Duma nor in the overwhelming majority of governmental structures nor in journalists unions and organizations have even suspected it. If there have been discussions, they have taken place in smoking rooms and suggested that either Gryzunov would be removed soon or that the Committee on the Press would be disbanded. Even the information support administration of the president's administration whose functions openly duplicate the functions of Gosinform knew nothing at all.

If we look very closely, there was something to cover up here. Indeed, the first lines of the draft produce painful memories—of agitprop [agitation and propaganda department] and that cold entryway to the CPSU Central Committee where it was located. It is easy to say that Gosinform is the latest presidential administrative structure. In market conditions, the structure is supposed to concentrate ALL levels of influence on Russia's information space in a few hands. It directly follows from the draft that the authorities intend to safely bury the era of decentralization and return to the methods of Comrade Suslov, slightly modernized for 1995, a year of preelection feuds.

For most of the people closely grouped around Mr. President, the most important thing is extending his presidential powers. It is obvious that Sergey Gryzunov was in fact found to avoid annoying blunders in this matter. In recent times he has been the one mentioned in public harping on the subject of personal dedication to the current president.

But for a leader of such a pretentious structure which society is supposed to swallow in the dress of Gosinform, there is little love for the president. And love of the president himself is not enough. The respect of the journalist community is needed too. As is well known, as chairman of the Committee on the Press, and especially deputy chairman, Mr. Gryzunov had it. True, for a record short time. After that relations fell apart painfully. The press began to write that Mr. Gryzunov came to his high post not to do business and not to organize the newspaper and magazine market, which would have been natural, but increasingly to engage in big-time politics.

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However, the Russian press is not the city of Groznyy. It cannot be taken with missile and bomb strikes and punitive actions. The country still has a directly operative Constitution whose articles prohibit not only any infringements on freedom of the press but ANY attempts "to control the mass information media." So if the draft does in fact become an edict, the Journalists Union and other professional journalistic organizations and associations have every opportunity to appeal to the Constitutional Court.

The principle of personal dedication is becoming the most important one in domestic politics, and some things in Russia today can pivot only around that. And the only thing left is to tell the president "thank you." Concerned about the fate of the Fatherland day and night, he decided that if the press was lacking something, it was state support, and if society was lacking something, it was a state information policy. Otherwise where did such a draft come from? But, we will dare to assure you, Mr. President, that we would be better off without that kind of state support. It very much resembles the agitprop type of stranglehold, which Mr. President is very familiar with from his former work in the CPSU Central Committee.

Regional Affairs

Decision by Sverdlovsk Duma Defies Moscow

954F2262A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 21-27 Apr 95 No 15, p 2

[Article by Vadim Chelikov, MN correspondent: "Defying Moscow, the Urals Want To Transform"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The first congress of a nonparty movement known as Transformation of the Urals was held in Yekaterinburg. The congress nominated Eduard Rossel, the incumbent chairman of the Sverdlovsk Regional Duma, to the post of regional governor. The Transformation of the Urals association appeared 18 months ago when, with a presidential decree, Rossel was dismissed from his position as head of the Sverdlovsk Region's administration. The unemployed Rossel then agreed to head a movement which set as its aim the achievement of economic independence for the region. Transformation of the Urals brings together different organizations, including the Party of Economic Freedom, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and the Cossacks and miners' trade unions. Among its members are the heads of administrations of a number of the region's cities and districts, as well as entrepreneurs, scientists and journalists. Until now the movement's activities have been expressed in the need to send as many "transformers" as possible to the Regional Duma. Representatives from the movement have taken seven seats there out of 28. Today Transformation of the Urals is preparing for gubernatorial elections.

Incidentally, nobody can say for sure whether these elections will take place. With a decision of the Sverdlovsk Duma under Rossel's chairmanship the elections have been set for next June. But Alexei Strakhov, the incumbent governor, maintains that it is too early to hold them.

Rossel maintains that by putting off and forbidding the gubernatorial elections, Moscow is seeking to retain its power over the regions inasmuch as it is advantageous for the Kremlin to have administration heads who can be appointed or dismissed with a presidential decree.

The members of Transformation of the Urals see a way out of the statehood crisis in the final equalization of the rights of territories and regions with those of the national republics which are constituent parts of Russia. They will therefore support Rossel's plans because it is he that has been the most persistent in advocating the idea of regional policy. According to Rossel, the idea of regionalism has received support from Boris Yeltsin.

*Volga Regions Seeking Greater Economic Autonomy

954E0951A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 May 95 p 2

[Article by Konstantin (Lange) under the rubric "Regional Economic Policy": "The Volga Region Is Counting on Government Concessions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Volga regions intend to increase their pressure on the federal government, as was testified by a session of the council of the Greater Volga association for economic interaction that was held recently in Samara. The support of the federal government for the issue of Nizhniy Novgorod and Samara regional securities has aroused particular hopes among the members of the association. They figure that the time has come to demand tax concessions from the government as well.*

The traditional battle between the center and the regions for mutual economic concessions has now clearly become more lively. After the government announced the transition to a tight budget policy, the local authorities, fearing a reduction in federal financing, immediately stepped up their lobbying activity—and their losses proved not to be too considerable as a result (and the number of subsidized regions even increased). Many regions in turn began developing their own schemes for financing the expenses of the local budgets through the issue of securities—referring therein to the fact that the

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federal government itself had resolved to cover the federal budget deficit in just that way. The local authorities demanded government support for this initiative—and they were indeed able to get it.

This experience in pressuring the government was vigorously discussed at the last council session of the Greater Volga association for the economic interaction of the Volga regions. That is entirely natural if you take into account that one of the chief initiators of the introduction of the regional securities that proved so successful were members of the association—Nizhnyy Novgorod and Samara oblasts. The decision made at the session was quite radical—to float an interregional Volga loan immediately (an "association loan") and seek the support of the government for that as well.

The leaders of the Volga oblast administrations who were present at the meeting decided not to limit themselves to this, and to make more sweeping demands of the government. The issue of the protection of domestic goods producers is to be resolved immediately, a moratorium is to be imposed on price increases for energy resources, and a stable exchange rate of the ruble to the dollar is to be ensured in particular.

The greatest enthusiasm among the participants in the session was elicited by the paper of the president of the association and head of the administration of Samara Oblast, Konstantin Titov, titled "A System of Taxation in the Economic Mechanism of Business Operations," in which he criticized the tax policies of the government. The essence of the proposals proved to be exceedingly simple—we must lighten the tax system immediately, so as to stimulate a rise in production. The members of the association demanded in particular to be released from the taxation of investor contributions and the profits of enterprises aimed at the development of production. The immediate abolition of advance tax payments also ended up included in the demands.

It turned out, however, that the representatives of the regions were prepared not to insist too much on the radical liberalization of the tax system if the center were to agree to expand their own taxing authority. It was proposed in particular to support the demand sent to the government by Samara Oblast to leave 70 percent of all tax receipts within the region. "It is essential," in the words of Konstantin Titov, "that similar proposals be prepared by all subjects of the federation that are part of the association."

*Social, Economic Problems of Northern Regions

954F2238A Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 6

[Article by Yu. Rogozhin, journalist, and V. Filonenko, section supervisor of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Committee on Affairs of the North and Small Nations: "Refuges of the North"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In opening the parliamentary hearings "On State Policy in the Northern Regions," Valentin Tsvetkov, chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Affairs of the North and Small Nations, bitterly remarked that life in the Arctic is no less dangerous now than in Chechnya: People are dying—if not from bullets, then from hunger and cold. Russia's North needs the assistance of the state and the attention of the government no less than the North Caucasus.

Rayons of the Far North and territories equivalent to them occupy more than 60 percent of all Russian land. Twenty-seven components of the Federation are located here (although some of them only partially), among which there are six oblasts and eight autonomous okrugs. Exaggerating a little, it can be said that almost all of Russia is Northern territory. Of course, this cannot be said of the population. A total of 11 million persons live on an enormous territory of 11 million square kilometers, into which 20 Frances could easily fit.

Such a sparse population is untypical not only for Europe, but also for Russia. The overwhelming portion of Russians by no means prefer to live in the "Northern areas."

Only native nationalities (which number about three dozen) became accustomed over the centuries to life in the North. But their total number is only 183,000.

Huge natural resources are concealed in the bleak Northern territories. Already today three-quarters of all Russian oil, up to 90 percent of the natural gas, and a substantial amount of the diamonds, gold, and nonferrous metals are extracted here. A good half of the fish catch and ocean products of Russia fall to the Northern areas. And this is not to mention the lion's share of the take in furs and other types of products of animal and plant origin.

Social problems in the North became exacerbated as the main mass of Northerners became older. However, until recently it was possible to blunt this severity owing to the reverse outflow of veterans of the North to the central and southern regions. Having accumulated sizable sums over long years of heavy work and difficult climatic conditions, they were able to buy themselves

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normal housing, in which they were helped by Northern enterprises and to which the state contributed as much as it could.

With the beginning of perestroyka, the economic situation in the North began to change quickly for the worse and the outflow increased sharply. The decline in production in the Northern republics, krays, and oblasts is "outstripping" the general Russian industrial decline.

Last year, approaching the end of the traditional period of navigation in the rayons of the Far North, only one-third of the necessary needs had been delivered. However, there were also economic reasons for this from the very beginning. Over the last three years rates for shipment of goods by the maritime fleet in the Arctic increased by a factor of 425! It is not therefore surprising that during this time cargo turnover in the Port of Dikson decreased by a factor of seven. The cost of an air ticket along the Tyumen-Moscow route in 1993 alone increased almost by a factor of 40, causing a decrease in the volume of air deliveries by almost a factor of two. Under these conditions it was impossible to find the resources in the lean state budget for subsidies for the delivery of goods to the rayons of the Far North in time.

The problem of cargo delivery to the Arctic threatens to repeat itself in worse form next year. There is no hope in the authorities, and it appears it will be necessary to start developing alternatives. Why not transfer resolution of this problem into the hands of private trade-purchase companies that have long experience of working in the North? And turn over control of the execution of their duties to insurance organizations.

The greatest decline in the standard of living of Northerners has appeared among the small nations, among which almost a third of the able-bodied population is unemployed. But if the Chukchi and the Zvenki, despite all the difficulties and problems, continue to hold on to traditional dwelling places, the nonnative population will look more and more frequently toward returning.

According to data of the Committee on Affairs of the North, about 2 million of those living there have declared a desire to depart from these rayons. Of approximately 400,000 families of potential resettlers, only a little more than a half consist of families of pensioners. The fact that more and more people of able-bodied age are trying to leave the "Northern areas" represents a typical feature of today's Russian reality. Does the government today understand that an outflow of the skilled work force from the Northern territories could throw us back to the initial stage of their assimilation and will erase all the achievements and successes of more than a half century and inflict colossal damage to the economy of the country?

Evaluating the situation that has developed, the executive committee of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia recently made an announcement in which it summarized that the "policy of the state regarding a sharp reduction in financing the North has brought the economies of Northern territories to the brink of life and death." The statement notes that owing to the outstripping price increases in the North, the level of incomes there practically equalled the average Russian level. Under these conditions, work in the Northern areas became economically pointless for many. These are the reasons for the trend toward the depopulation of the North, which has intensified in recent years.

Judging by everything, the government does not properly realize that not only the fate of the reforms it has declared but also the fate of the government as a whole and of individual members of the cabinet depends in many ways on how affairs in the Russian North unfold. It is possible that tomorrow there will be nothing with which to pay the expenditures for the maintenance of special dachas, special guards, and other special goodies that the large officialdom of various structures of authority—which tirelessly asserts its democratism—has established for itself. For heaven's sake, the leaders should give some thought to this.

However, if not the government, then we, the millions of intelligent and creative citizens of Russia, should be concerned about our North for the sake of Russia and our future descendants. It is not true that officials must manage society as if it were a herd. On the contrary, they are obliged to be responsible to society. Including for the ruin of the North. And this responsibility implies the replacement of negligent rulers. Democracy indeed also denotes an effective mechanism for the formation of the executive authority at the hands (more precisely, with the votes) of citizens and the leadership of society over the state.

*Conference Views Moscow Relations to Regions

954F2244B Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 5

[Interview with Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Denisova, chairman, Murmansk Oblast Administration Committee for Economics, Analysis and Forecasting, by N. Khlebnikova; place and date of interview not given: "These Are Your Powers, Subject of the Federation!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Delimiting Powers Between Bodies of Government of the Federation and Subjects of the Federation" was the dry title of a topic that

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assumed special acuity for our oblast last year, when an attempt was made to get an O.K. from the center for organizing the "Murman" free economic zone. As it turns out, however, things didn't proceed quickly and successfully.

Late in March a scientific-practical conference was held in Moscow to discuss the problem on an all-Russian scale. Lyudmila Denisova, chairman of the oblast administration's Committee for Economics, Analysis and Forecasting took part in the conference.

[Khlebnikova] Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, they say that nothing is as good for practice as good theory. How representative was the conference?

[Denisova] The participants of the conference included Sergey Filatov, Sergey Shakhray, Ramazan Abdulatipov, Anatoliy Sliva, Deputy Minister for Nationalities Affairs Aleksandr Kotenkov, and specialists from the presidential administration. Science was represented by the Institute of Government and Law and the Institute of Comparative Legislation. Also present were representatives of all subjects of the federation. A draft law on delimitation of powers that the government was to present to the Duma was offered to the participants for discussion.

What kind of state are we intending to construct? That became the key question at the conference. It became clear that we have not formulated the concept or established the schools of thought in a theoretical aspect, and consequently there are neither proponents nor opponents. Our scientific leaders explain this by saying that for the last 70 years, the principles of a federated union were put out of sight and mind. Theoreticians felt that Lenin's premises regarding the right of national self-determination and the integrity of the state border were mutually exclusive. But in reality, how can a nation undergo self-determination, going as far as secession, without disturbing a state border?

While criticizing Vladimir Ilich, today's science is not offering any new points of reference for practical workers. We still do not have even a strictly determined conceptual apparatus. How do we interpret the key work "federalism"? Two interpretations of this phenomenon are possible. Under one, rights are delegated from below, from the people, to bodies of local self-management, the latter transfer part of their powers to regional bodies, and so on to federal bodies that express the interests of the one state.

However, federalism may also be defined as a process directed from top down: The center transfers more and more powers to local governments, to subjects of the federation, and the latter do so to bodies of local self-management. Considering Russian traditions and Russian mentality—we all remember democratic centralism from grade school, after all—the second interpretation is better suited to us. And it was clearly evident from statements at the conference that this is the more acceptable path for Russia.

However, it is important to reach agreement not only at the conference. The fundamental concepts need to be confirmed in a legal standard that would require everyone to accept the same definition, in the same key, only in this one way, and not in any other.

[Khlebnikova] There is no theory, and there is no adequate legal foundation; nonetheless, an interdepartmental commission has been established under the president to examine draft agreements on delimitation of powers. What guidelines are officials of this and other structures to follow when making conclusions and adopting decisions?

[Denisova] Our experience has shown that subjectivity prevails. We could of course take a neutral position by saying that priority should be laid on the principle of an individual approach. One relationship to the Republic of Bashkortostan, another to Krasnodar Kray, and a third to Murmansk Oblast. Yes, each subject of the Russian Federation is uniqui, and it may be that some sort of specific relationship is needed. But I feel in this case that the procedure itself of examining agreements must be singular and unified. Right now, there are no clear rules: Who must do what, when, where and how? What is the procedure for coordinating on drafts, and what is the decision making procedure? When we coordinated on our draft agreement, the Ministry for Nationalities Affairs was our overseer. Unfortunately the Ministry for Nationalities Affairs hasn't even put its own work in order. Today we go to one specialist, and tomorrow they will send us to another who doesn't know what an earlier one decided.

[Khlebnikova] Hasn't this agreement on delimitation of powers lost its importance to our oblast? After all, it was believed that it would open up a superhighway for the region's development. Serious socioeconomic content was introduced into the draft agreement. What was the reaction to this in Moscow?

[Denisova] We coordinated the agreement with 12 ministries and departments. There, the approach is like this: Since a federal law is already in place to regulate financial and international economic relations, nature use and so on, and since it is written in the Constitution that the issue is to be resolved by federal legislation, then bring your agreement in line with the Constitution. And when we began on this, we had to abandon specific socioeconomic language. We realized that in order to

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resolve issues in relation to which federal law is either silent or ambiguous, we had to first determine the procedures to be followed in our mutual relations with ministries and departments. After all, today it takes a colossal effort just to bring an idea or amendment we have as a subject of the federation to the needed people, and compel them to acquaint themselves with it, not to mention accepting this idea.

Still, we would like the federal agreement to provide ready access to the ministries and departments, and guarantee that our paperwork will not be set aside, that it will be examined within 10 days, and that an official reply would be forthcoming.

Here as well, by the way, there is an issue that has not been theoretically resolved: Who is to conclude an agreement with whom? According to the established practice, an agreement is concluded by the administrative head of a subject of the Russian Federation with the president. Is this proper? Not entirely, I feel, because the Constitution states that delimitation of powers is a matter for bodies of state government. But according to the Constitution, legislative, executive and judicial bodies are all bodies of state government. That means that all three must determine who is to delimit powers with whom, and in what proportions. Once this is done, it will immediately become clear that the approach to delimiting powers between executive bodies cannot be the same as that to delimiting powers between legislative and, all the more so, judicial government.

In our place as the administration of Murmansk Oblast, we can apply for delimitation of powers in relation to the supreme bodies of executive government. Our hope is that clear rules of negotiation with them will allow us to resolve socioeconomic issues important to the region more productively. This by the way was the theme in the statements of many kray and oblast representatives. They see conclusion of an agreement as a possibility for putting their mutual relations with the center, and primarily financial relations, in order: determining not only rights but also mutual responsibility. What happens today? The right to solve a problem is transferred to local authorities, but funds needed for doing so are not released. And when a particular law or presidential edict is not fulfilled, the issue of responsibility arises. A subject of the federation that possesses a right but no money finds itself in an ambiguous situation.

[Khlebnikova] But as long as Moscow's relations with the republics and oblasts are subjective, it could be that not all subjects of the federation are even interested in changing the current state of affairs.

[Denisova] Yes, unfortunately we have yet another case where the right of a separately taken individual prevails, and not a legislatively confirmed right. This is why astounding things happen in the overall treaty-making process in Russia. One of the republics—I'm not going to say which one—based its agreement on a rewriting of the fundamental articles of the Constitution. At the conference, the representative was asked: "Why did you opt for such an agreement, what did you get out of it?" He replied: "It was important at that time for the Russian Federation to recognize us as a party to the agreement."

Even if subjects of the federation all have the same goal—improving financial mutual relations, we are not united by a shared idea of how to reach this goal, which is why there is so much disorder and vacillation in our ranks. In order to overcome this, in particular we need to have well-honed procedures for determining the socioeconomic resources of a given territory. Much was said about this at the conference as well.

First, a subject of the federation must make a contribution to the common pot on the basis of an objective, universal appraisal of its tax potential: According to the calculations, such-and-such a territory could have such-and-such a tax base.

Second, we need a system of social standards—who gets how much from the common pot? Were each subject of the federation to adopt such a scientifically grounded and necessarily open system, there would be no disputes or reciprocal accusations: Someone got more while someone else got less, this one's treatment was irregular, and that one's was unobjective.

If we return to the problems of our oblast, the master balance sheet of our resources shows that we can collect 5.4 trillion rubles on our territory, and that our needs are covered by this amount. But first of all we have the obligation to transfer a trillion and a half to the federal budget and to centralized funds. Which puts the oblast into the red. Consequently we are naturally interested in seeing that the trillion and a half are used to the benefit of both Russia and Murmansk Oblast. But when we find that the transfer system—that is, the system for supporting subjects of the federation—is imperfect, and when the reaction to our proposals on improving it is that the task is beyond their means, that it is very difficult to change the system, and when we see blatant examples of imperfections in this system itself, this naturally causes us to raise objections, and to seek a solution to the problem by way of an agreement.

[Khlebnikova] As we know, it appeared that the government would return to the Murmansk agreement after adopting the corresponding law. Is the fate of agreements of other territories also made dependent upon the law?

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[Denisova] We were preceded in this process by Kaliningrad, and we, Krasnodar, Novgorod and Samara applied together. Not a single oblast has been released to sign an agreement; moreover, signing an agreement with the Komi Republic has been put on hold. Representatives from the republics exhibited noticeable displeasure in the fact that some managed to get through the door in time, while others were not.

Representatives of the federal government said on one hand that there was no need to hurry in reaching new agreements before the basic positions are determined, and on the other that nothing would be gained from interrupting the agreement process. Those that have signed agreements offer both positive and negative experiences.

Everyone noted that a law is needed as a framework upon which to hang the more specific provisions. But it was clearly felt in this case that if the law fails to clearly define how we are to envision construction of the federation—from the bottom up, or from the top down, if we fail to define the concept of objects of joint management and the concept of powers itself, and if the mechanisms by which all branches of power are to interact both locally and in the center are not determined, the law will remain a dead law. After all, the purpose of the law is to set a new stage for conducting negotiations, for drafting these agreements, and for developing a nationwide idea of what kind of state the Russian Federation must be.

*Murmansk Oblast Wage Statistics

954F2244A Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Drivers Earn the Most, Bibliographers and Doctors Earn the Least"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The average income of one worker in February 1995 was 656,000 rubles according to data provided by enterprises on funds earmarked for payment of wages (not counting taxes and other withholdings). This is 17,000 more than last month.

Also interesting is the fact that the average pay of workers in the nonproductive sphere was only 65.9 percent of the average pay in productive sectors (78.1 percent in January).

The average pay received by Northerners (based on the wage fund earmarked for listed workers) in individual economic sectors is characterized by the following data:

	Average Wages Per Worker (Thousands of Rubles)			February 1995 as % of January 1995	February 1995 as % of February 1994 (Factor)	Average Listed Number of Workers, % of Total
	February 1995	% of Average	January-February 1995			
TOTAL	634	100	624	102	2.2	100.0
Productive Sphere	715	113.689	107	2.5	62.6	
including:						
industry	780	123	741	111	2.7	30.8
agriculture	491	77	466	113	2.2	3.3
forestry	338	53	332	103	2.2	0.2
transportation	809	128	866	87	2.0	10.6
construction	666	105	619	115	2.7	8.5
trade, public food services	546	86	516	112	2.4	6.7
Nonproductive Sphere	471	74	489	91	1.7	37.4
including:						

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	Average Wages Per Worker (Thousands of Rubles)			February 1995 as % of January 1995	February 1995 as % of February 1994 (Factor)	Average Listed Number of Workers, % of Total
	February 1995	% of Average	January-February 1995			
housing and municipal services, nonproductive forms of personal services to the public	559	88	524	106	1.9	5.2
public health, physical culture, sports, social welfare	377	59	362	101	1.6	8.9
education	352	56	349	101	1.6	11.7
culture and the arts	314	50	313	100	1.5	2.0

***Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Polled on Concerns**

954F2268A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by A.A. Iudin, sociologist at the Scientific Research and Sociology Center: "What Is Troubling People in Nizhniy Novgorod"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problems and complexities of contemporary life are being accompanied by a steady deterioration in the social and psychological sense of well-being of the populace. In March, 70 percent of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens stated that their quality of life had deteriorated, half of these asserting that it had deteriorated appreciably.

This deterioration in quality of life and the aggravated socioeconomic situation in society has led people to view the future with increased anxiety (see Table 1). Some 40 percent of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens have positive feelings about their future, while 59 percent have negative feelings. The majority of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens were positive in their social and psychological outlook up to the beginning of this year—this despite the war in Chechnya, increased prices, and conflict and scandals in the upper echelons of power on both the federal and local levels. However, the relative stability of people's quality-of-life appraisals was destroyed a good time sooner—in October-November 1994. The diminished optimism at the outset of this year is not just related to life's economic difficulties. It is important to note that the sense of social and psychological well-being has been deteriorating primarily in that segment of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens who are not loyal to the central or local authorities. The social outlook of these people is twice as negative as is the case with loyal citizens.

The structure of life anxieties of the Nizhniy Novgorod population has changed only slightly. As before, the people are troubled most of all by socioeconomic problems—inflation, price increases, inability to put money aside for a rainy day, and constant devaluation of monetary savings accumulated. Anxiety caused by inflation is increasing slowly but steadily, and is nearing the critical 85 percent mark. This means it will become a problem for all segments and groups of the populace. It is clear that inflation is the number one consideration behind most of the population's concerns.

The people's attitude toward certain problems is not changing. Such problems include the lack of social and legal protection for citizens, the intensified stratification of society into rich and poor, the housing problem, and the problem of Russia's declining international prestige.

The high incidence of crime in the city is alarming Nizhniy Novgorod citizens somewhat less than other problems. This is apparently related to the fact that today people are facing new problems, and they tend to forget about the old ones. The attitude of the populace toward the events in Chechnya sharply illustrates the influence of the mass media on the public consciousness and social outlook of the population. In March, the federal mass media softened the social and psychological pressure they had been exerting with respect to Chechnya, causing the problem's significance to drop sharply in the eyes of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens.

In general, however, the influence of sociopolitical factors on the mood of the populace increased appreciably in March—issues such as corruption of the state apparatus and the failure of local organs of authority to carry out sound policy. It should be noted that at the end of 1994, about 15 percent of the populace was disturbed by ill-considered policy being carried out by local organs of authority. In March of this year, the problem

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troubled 41 percent of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens (see Table 2). This clearly reflects the increased concern being shown by Nizhniy Novgorod citizens with regard to the conflict surrounding the Oka plant in Navashino.

This theme also has an effect on other sociopolitical concerns. Especially noticeable has been the growth of anxiety on the part of Nizhniy Novgorod citizens with respect to the ecological situation in the city, the augmented role of mafia structures, increased spiritual impoverishment of the nation, the growth of absolute power and absence of control with respect to local officials. All of these concerns are manifest in the fact that Nizhniy Novgorod citizens are more disturbed now than before by city problems and less alarmed by statewide concerns.

We have noted repeatedly that there is a difference in perception of the sociopolitical situation in the city and the country between Nizhniy Novgorod citizens loyal to the authority and those not loyal to the authority. These two groups of the populace have approximately the same view only with respect to such factors as inflation, price increases, and the absence of social protection for citizens. But today the concerns of both loyal and disloyal citizens are very much alike regarding objective factors devoid of pronounced ideological content such as city crime and falling production. The anxiety of loyal Nizhniy Novgorod citizens has increased in a great number of areas and is approaching the level expressed by disloyals. In almost the same manner as the disloyals, they are disturbed at the collapse of Russia's economy, the decline in Russia's international prestige, the ill-considered policies of the Russian leadership and local organs of power, and the lack of legal protection for citizens.

On the whole, the structure of concerns of loyal citizens differs only slightly from that of the selective sampling overall. The difference is related only to an increased level of calm observed within this population group. Disloyal citizens are appreciably more disturbed than the others when it comes to factors with ideological content, such as turning Russia into a raw material appendage of the Western countries, the augmented role of mafia structures, spiritual impoverishment of the nation, intensification of the division of society into rich and poor, corruption of the state apparatus along with its exercise of absolute power, and the lack of control over local officials. These citizens are more alarmed than the others by the military conflict in Chechnya, although to a significantly lesser extent in March than in February. They are greatly disturbed at the constant devaluation of monetary savings accumulated by citizens. But this is apparently related to their social position—this group is comprised of somewhat older and poorer people.

Table 1. Nature of Hope in the Future (percent)

Month	Optimistically	Calmly	Anxiously	Fearfully
September 1994	16	42	32	9
October	17	41	30	10
November	18	36	35	11
December	15	36	36	12
January 1995	14	31	39	11
March	8	32	42	17

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Table 2. Factors Causing Nizhniy Novgorod Citizens Alarm (percent)

Problem	1994			1995	
	March	June	September	January	March
Inflation, price increases	47	60	57	75	78
Ecological situation in the city	32	40	33	35	51
Corruption of the state apparatus	24	21	15	26	51
Declining production	-	39	39	43	48
Spiritual impoverishment of the nation	24	26	34	28	45
Augmented role of mafia structures	32	30	27	31	41
Ill-considered policies of local organs of power	17	16	14	14	41
Lack of social protection for citizens	37	37	33	39	39
Intensified division of society into rich and poor	-	37	33	36	39
Absolute power and lack of control of local officials	16	17	16	20	37
High level of crime in the city	49	42	43	47	36
Lack of legal protection for citizens	30	29	32	36	33
Housing problem	31	29	30	31	32
Decline of Russia's international prestige	-	-	-	25	27
Ill-considered policies of the Russian leadership	30	27	31	37	26
Collapse of the Russian economy	-	-	-	60	25
Military conflict in Chechnya	-	-	-	63	19
Conversion of Russia into a raw materials appendage of the Western countries	-	-	-	29	17

*Cost of Siberian Apartments Increases

954F2218A Novosibirsk DELOVAYA SIBIR in Russian 13-19 Apr 95 No 14, p 10

[Unattributed article: "Survey of Real Estate Market Prices in Siberian Cities: Beginning of April 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratsk—According to data from specialists at the AURUM real estate agency in Tomsk, apartment prices have been growing faster than in other Siberian cities lately. As in Novosibirsk, an increase in solvent demand in Tomsk has led to a "running jump" in prices in various rayons. At the beginning of April, the average cost of one square meter in the city reached 1.016 million rubles [R]. Over the two preceding weeks, it grew by 16.6 percent. In the center of town, the cost of a square meter rose by 18.2 percent, and now stands at R1.265 million. In rayons somewhat removed from the center, the price increased by 16.7 percent and reached R956,000. For the same period, the growth in cost for a square meter on the outskirts of town was 14.2 percent (R827,000).

According to data from the DOM analytical service at the Barnaul real estate agency, in the last two weeks a shift in buyers' interests towards the center has led to an increase in apartment costs only in this rayon. The intensive growth in the dollar's exchange rate has caused a proportional and even slightly greater growth in apartment costs, while consumer solvency has lagged

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behind the dollar's exchange rate. This state of affairs has caused a discrepancy between buyers' needs and sellers' demands. As a result, the average time for an apartment's sales "cycle" has increased significantly. It is interesting that this kind of situation has developed not only in Barnaul but in other Siberian cities as well. Today the average cost of one square meter in the city is R1.099 million. In the center of town, that indicator is R1.686 million Its growth rate was 12.6 percent. Prices in the other rayons have not changed.

According to data from the analytical department of the ERSIKO real estate agency, the number of apartments for sale on the Novosibirsk housing market in March increased by 29 percent. This also led to a certain drop in the growth rates in prices over the last two weeks compared with the preceding period. On the average, in the city the cost of one square meter of total area was R1.366 million. It grew over the two weeks by 4.7 percent. On the outskirts of town, a square meter now costs R1.017 million; in rayons somewhat removed from the center it costs R1.214 million; along subway lines it costs R1.386 million; and in the center it costs R1.847 million. According to predictions by the ERSIKO agency's analysts, by mid-May the cost of a square meter in the center of town will reach the R2 million mark, and that indicator's average value for the city will be equal to R1.5 million.

According to data from the Novokuznetsk Real Estate Bureau, the amount of housing for sale is increasing, but despite this, a relatively intensive growth in prices continues, while the sales volume has dropped due to the unsuitability of those prices for consumer needs. Over the last two weeks of March, housing costs rose on the average for the city by 12 percent. Here, in contrast to other cities in the region, the cost of housing in the center of town is rising more slowly than in all other areas. For the period indicated, it rose by 6.4 percent (R1.108 million per square meter); on the outskirts it rose by 18.5 percent; and in rayons somewhat removed from the center it rose by 15.8 percent. The cost of a square meter on the outskirts is R813,000 and in rayons somewhat removed from the center R899,000. For the city on the average, the cost of one square meter of total area was R940,000.

Monitored Apartment Prices (in millions of rubles)

City	Agency	Prestige rayons	1-room	2-room	3-room	4-5-room
Novosibirsk	ERSIKO real estate agency	Outskirts	30-45	44-54	58-72	81-100
		Somewhat removed	40-49	52-63	71-85	103-120
		On subway lines	43-53	60-75	84-100	124-156
		Center	54-65	81-100	120-140	150-180
Tomsk	AURUM real estate agency	Outskirts	20-27	33-45	53-70	63-80
		Somewhat removed	25-32	40-52	65-83	70-100
		Center	30-45	50-80	80-110	110-150
Barnaul	DOM real estate agency	Potok	26-32	35-45	40-55	45-70
		Far and Near Cheremushki	30-40	40-53	4[illegible]70	50-95
		Urozhaynyi	30-38	40-55	50-70	55-100
		Adjacent to center	33-45	45-65	60-100	65-120
		Center	40-60	55-130	65-190	75-240

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City	Agency	Prestige rayons	1-room	2-room	3-room	4-5-room
Novokuznetsk	Real Estate Bureau	Outskirts	20-28	32-52	50-72	80-85
	Somewhat removed	22-32	42-50	52-80	82-87	
	Center	30-40	43-70	62-98	70-140	

Material prepared by ERSIKO analytical department.

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Turkmenistan

*Agreement With Russia on Trade, Economic Cooperation

954F2236A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 95 p 14

["Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of Turkmenistan on Basic Principles of Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government and the Government of Turkmenistan, henceforth referred to as the Parties,

guided by the Treaty on Establishment of the Economic Union, 24 September 1993,

proceeding from the need to strengthen and develop trade and economic relations between Russia and Turkmenistan in the interests of both states,

attaching great significance to the establishment of favorable conditions for the development of market relations, and to the preservation and development of production and technology ties among enterprises, organizations, and other management entities of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan,

have agreed to the following:

Article 1

Trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan is based on principles of equality and mutual benefit. It is carried out through the conclusion of direct contracts between state organs and management entities, regardless of form of ownership or subordination, in compliance with the legislation of each of the states.

The entities concluding such contracts bear responsibility for their implementation.

Transaction settlements between management entities for product deliveries shall be effected at contract prices.

Payment, settlement, and credit relations between the Parties are regulated by a separate agreement.

Article 2

The Parties shall not effect the allocation and licensing of product deliveries through reciprocal barter arrangements, with the exception of products that are exported in accordance with international obligations and products for which special export procedure has been established.

Article 3

The Parties shall facilitate the accomplishment of reciprocal priority shipments of the most important product varieties in 1995 in volumes as indicated in Appendices 1 and 2 to this agreement.

Article 4

The Parties shall provide assistance in preserving and developing ties between management entities of both states, including assistance based on specialization and cooperative effort that has been achieved. They shall facilitate the establishment and operation of joint enterprises, interstate economic structures, and transnational firms, and shall assist in effecting joint investments and conversion to joint-stock operation of facilities of mutual interest.

Article 5

The Parties shall sign, prior to 1 May 1995, an agreement on the conversion of Russian Federation state credits received into U.S. dollars, under terms stipulated by Article 2 of the Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and Government of Turkmenistan, dated 2 June 1993, which regulates the indebtedness proceeding from the payments imbalance arising between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan from the results of 1992 and first half of 1993. Turkmenistan shall pay off the credits and interest accrued on the use of credits in 1995 under the terms stipulated by Article 3 of the above-mentioned agreement.

Article 6

The Parties shall ensure that favorable conditions are established in the territories of their states for the reciprocal transportation of passengers and freight, including use of a free-transit operating mode in rail, motor-vehicle, water air, and pipeline transportation.

Article 7

The Parties shall effect the exchange of information through appropriate agencies on adopted normative acts that deal with matters of foreign economic activity and on statistics and customs reporting and accountability with respect to reciprocal product deliveries.

Article 8

In the event disputes arise regarding the interpretation or application of provisions of this agreement, the Parties shall resolve them through negotiations.

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APPENDIX 1. Volumes of Priority Shipments of the Most Important Product Varieties From the Russian Federation to Turkmenistan in 1995

Product	Unit of measurement	Quantity
Liquefied gas	tonne	45,000
Steel pipe	tonne	9,000
Rolled aluminum	tonne	2,200
Rolled copper	tonne	200
Commercial timber	cubic meter	60,000
Sawn lumber	cubic meter	100,000
Newsprint	tonne	5,300
Earth mover, with single bucket from 0.275 to 3.2 cubic meters capacity	each	150
Wheeled-vehicle-mounted crane	each	50
Scraper-excavator	each	20
Loader	each	15
Motor grader	each	15
Drilling rig	each	19
Oil-drilling equipment	rubles	5 billion
Oil and gas refining equipment	rubles	1.5 billion
Tractor	each	120
Grain-harvesting combine, total	each	600
including:		
Yenisey-1200	each	300
Niva	each	300
Bus	each	90

APPENDIX 2. Volumes of Priority Shipments of the Most Important Product Varieties From Turkmenistan to the Russian Federation in 1995

Product	Unit of measurement	Quantity
Cotton fiber	tonne	70,000
Sheepskin pelt	each	300,000
Oil electrode coke	tonne	150,000
Wine stock	dekaliters	6.000 million
Vegetable oil	tonne	40,000

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